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THE TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Marc O. DeGirolami *

This Article identifies a new method of constitutional interpretation: the use of tradition as
constitutive of constitutional meaning. It studies what the Supreme Court means by invoking
tradition and whether what it means remains constant across the document and over time. Traditionalist interpretation is pervasive, consistent, and recurrent across the Court’s constitutional
doctrine. So, too, are criticisms of traditionalist interpretation. There are also more immediate
reasons to study the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation. The Court’s two newest
members, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, have indicated that tradition informs
their understanding of constitutional meaning. The study of traditionalist interpretation seems
all the more pressing to understand certain possible jurisprudential moves in the Court’s future.
This Article concludes that when the Court interprets traditionally, it signals the presumptive influence of political and cultural practices of substantial duration for informing constitutional meaning. Traditionalist interpretation is thus constituted of three elements: (1) a focus on
practices, rather than principles, as informing constitutional meaning; (2) a practice’s duration,
understood as a composite of its age and continuity; and (3) a practice’s presumptive, but defeasible, interpretive influence. Traditionalist interpretation’s emphasis on practices that are given
tangible form in a people’s lived experiences suggests that it is preferable to speak about politically
and culturally specific traditions rather than an abstracted concept of tradition. Hence, “the
traditions of American constitutional law.”
This Article identifies traditionalist interpretation as its own method; shows its prevalence
and methodological consistency across the domains of constitutional interpretation; isolates and
examines its constituent elements, comparing them against other prominent interpretive
approaches; and infers and explains the justifications of traditionalist interpretation from the
doctrinal deposit. While there may be some irony about a claim of novelty in an article about
tradition, what this Article identifies as new is not the invocation of tradition as such, but the
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isolation of a recurrent and consistent method—traditionalist interpretation—adopted by the
Court across its interpretive work. It aims to bring to light an overlooked and yet frequently used
interpretive practice, and to understand its structure, situation, and purpose within the Court’s
constitutional doctrine.

INTRODUCTION
This Article identifies a new method of constitutional interpretation: the
use of tradition to constitute constitutional meaning. Traditionalist interpretation has not gone altogether unnoticed. Scholars have spoken of
“[h]istorical [g]loss”1 or “[l]ongstanding custom and tradition”2 as relevant
to the meaning of specific constitutional provisions. Some have identified
the “liquidation” of constitutional meaning over a period of time as a method
advocated by James Madison.3 Others have doubted that tradition should
ever be an interpretive argument or justification at least as to certain issues.4
And still others have explored longstanding arrangements or practices in
other disciplines such as administrative law.5
But no one has studied what tradition signifies across the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. No one has examined how it
might differ from other interpretive techniques (such as reliance on text,
history, prudential considerations, moral principle, or precedent). There
has been no comprehensive account of the Court’s use of tradition or of its
reasons for interpreting traditionally.
This Article provides that account. It studies what the Court means by
invoking tradition, and whether what it means remains constant across the
document and over time. It shows that traditionalist interpretation is pervasive, consistent, and recurrent across the Court’s constitutional doctrine. So,
too, are the Court’s criticisms of traditionalist interpretation. There are
more immediate reasons to study the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation as well. The Court’s two newest members, Justices Neil Gorsuch
and Brett Kavanaugh, have indicated that tradition informs their understand1 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 412 (2012).
2 Michael W. McConnell, Lecture, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV.
1745, 1745–46 (2015); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence
of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 670–71 [hereinafter McConnell, The Right to Die] (noting the “historical rather than . . . philosophical” quality of the Court’s substantive due
process analysis as well as the Court’s reliance on “longstanding practice” as a justification
for the rejection of assisted suicide).
3 E.g., William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2019); see also
Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 10–14
(2001) (discussing Madison’s concept of “liquidation” and its similarity to stare decisis).
4 See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 341–43 (2011).
5 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1823, 1829, 1879–80 (2015).
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ing of constitutional meaning.6 The study of traditionalism therefore seems
all the more pressing to understand certain likely moves in the Court’s present and future.
This Article concludes that when the Court interprets traditionally, it
signals the presumptive influence of political and cultural practices of substantial duration for informing constitutional meaning. Four clarifications,
to be pursued later at greater length, may be useful now:
(1) Traditionalist interpretation focuses on practices, rather than
abstract principles or general tests, as constituting constitutional
meaning. The emphasis on practices that are given tangible form in
a people’s lived experience suggests that it is preferable to speak
about politically and culturally specific traditions rather than an
abstracted concept of tradition. Hence, “the traditions of American
constitutional law.”
(2) What is of interest are political and cultural practices, not judicial
precedents or doctrines. Distinguishing the former from the latter
marks the difference between traditionalist and precedential
interpretation.
(3) A tradition’s duration—combining two dimensions of age and continuity—may be understood metaphorically by imagining a ski
slope. The slope may be long or short; and it may be smooth or
sparse. Sections of the slope that are smooth may be densely packed
or coated only with a thin layer. A slope that is too short, or too
sparse, cannot be skied. Likewise, a tradition that is too short, or
too sparse, lacks interpretive authority.
(4) The interpretive influence of a tradition is presumptive and may be
overcome by other considerations. For example, a tradition is
authoritative only if it is consistent with constitutional text. Very
powerful moral or prudential arguments may overcome the presumption in favor of a tradition as well.
In Part I, this Article discusses various established methods of constitutional interpretation, identifies traditionalist interpretation as its own
method, and distinguishes it from others. Part II highlights areas in which
traditionalist interpretation has been most powerful in informing constitutional meaning. The survey in Part II is not exhaustive and does not list
unreflectively every instance of the Court’s use of the word “tradition” or its
cognates. Instead, this Article focuses on areas that reveal the Court’s use of
a consistent, multipart interpretive method across the constitutional
domains. In Part III, this Article distills three features of traditionalism that
emerge from the doctrine: (1) political and cultural practices; (2) duration,
6 Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274–75 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Christopher R. Green, Justice Gorsuch and Moral Reality, 70 ALA. L.
REV. 635, 647–48 (2019); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Keynote Address, Two Challenges for the Judge
as Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity and Constitutional Exceptions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1907,
1919 (2017) (observing that “[r]equiring judges to focus on history and tradition” might
make evaluation of certain legal questions clearer).
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understood as a composite of age and continuity; and (3) presumptive, but
defeasible, interpretive influence. It also touches on the relationship of traditionalism to prominent varieties of originalism and nonoriginalism.7 Part IV
addresses the “why” of traditionalism—the question of its normative point or
purpose. It extracts and synthesizes various purposes, explanations, and justifications from Part II’s doctrinal discussion. It concludes that traditionalism
reflects the views that actions sometimes speak louder than words—at least
words whose meanings are underdetermined; that the national takes priority
over the universal; and that constitutional interpretation, rather than constitutional adjudication, is its proper domain.
This Article unearths certain interpretive practices that reflect reasons
and values immanent in the Court’s jurisprudence, and it describes those
reasons and values as the Justices see them.8 Future work can then better
explore such questions as “do we like what we see?” or “when is traditionalism
justified and when isn’t it?”9 Other projects may follow as well, including
comparisons of traditionalism with other methods,10 or studies measuring
the strength of the presumption in favor of traditions in various textual contexts and what that might suggest about traditionalism’s interpretive power.
There may be some irony about a claim of novelty in an article about
tradition. But what this Article identifies as new is not the Court’s invocation
of tradition, but the isolation of a recurrent and consistent method—traditionalist interpretation—reflecting recurrent and consistent, even if infrequently articulated, justifications. It brings to light an overlooked and yet
frequently used interpretive practice, and it aims to understand its structure,
situation, and justification within the Court’s constitutional doctrine.
I. TRADITIONALISM

AS AN

INTERPRETIVE METHOD

In his seminal study of constitutional methodology, Philip Bobbitt proposed a typology of six distinctive “archetypes” of constitutional argument:
historical, textual, prudential, structural, doctrinal, and ethical.11 Bobbitt’s
premise was that any interpretive theory of the Constitution depends upon
actual interpretive practice. Thus, historical argument involves “the original
7 For further comparison of traditionalism and originalism, see Marc O. DeGirolami,
First Amendment Traditionalism, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3458033.
8 The debate about tradition’s merits as a guide for human life—in law and elsewhere—is an ancient one, stretching back at least as far as the rivalry between poetry and
philosophy in ancient Greece. See, e.g., EURIPIDES, THE BACCHÆ, ll. 200–04, reprinted in 1
THE TRAGEDIES OF EURIPIDES 249, 254 (Theodore Alois Buckley trans., London, Henry G.
Bohn 1850) (“Our ancestral traditions, and those which we have kept throughout our life,
no argument will overturn them; not if any one were to find out wisdom with the highest
genius.”)
9 See Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal Victimization, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1087,
1151–52 (2013).
10 See generally DeGirolami, supra note 7 (comparing traditionalism and originalism).
11 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7–8, 94
(1982).
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understanding of the constitutional provision to be construed.”12 Textual
arguments are claims concerning the ordinary meaning that people give the
Constitution’s words.13 Arguments from “prudence” authorize the balancing
or weighing of the social costs and benefits of any particular decision.14
Structural arguments are “inferences from the existence of constitutional
structures and the relationships which the Constitution ordains among these
structures.”15
Doctrinal and ethical methods merit slightly more discussion because
they relate more closely than the others to the interpretive method explored
in this Article. Doctrinal arguments derive constitutional meaning “from
those principles which precedent develops.”16 They depend upon the accretion of judicial opinions to inform constitutional meaning.17 The doctrinal
method was once favored by legal process theorists,18 and continues to
attract the notice of constitutional scholars.19 But all precedential interpretation emphasizes the cumulative force of Supreme Court opinions in the derivation of constitutional meaning.20
Finally, there are ethical arguments “whose force relies on a characterization of American institutions and the role within them of the American
people.”21 For example, the textual prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” in the Eighth Amendment is “evidence of a more general constitutional ethos, one principle of which is that government must not physically
degrade the persons for whose benefit it is created.”22 Once the ethical leap
12 Id. at 9.
13 See id. at 25–26.
14 See id. at 60. A decision not to decide a particular matter—for example, to “avoid
constitutional decision in order to safeguard the Court’s own position and to activate the
political processes of the legislature”—is also a form of prudential argument. Id. at 63; see
also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 127–28 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the practical constraints on the Court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction).
15 BOBBITT, supra note 11, at 74; see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3–32 (1969) (detailing the method of drawing inferences from structure in constitutional interpretation).
16 BOBBITT, supra note 11, at 40.
17 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV.
1, 2 (1979).
18 See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 163 (William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Found. Press 1994) (1958).
19 See, for example, the different approaches to precedent in RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED
VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 4–7 (2017); and DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION 3 (2010).
20 See, e.g., KOZEL, supra note 19, at 107; STRAUSS, supra note 19, at 33; see also Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen
this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of
prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a
prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”). See generally Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
21 BOBBITT, supra note 11, at 94.
22 Id. at 143.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL304.txt

1128

unknown

Seq: 6

notre dame law review

28-FEB-20

12:32

[vol. 95:3

to the Eighth Amendment’s “nondegradation principle” has been taken, a
judge applies the principle back down to a particular factual situation,23
holding, for example, that a life sentence without the possibility of parole for
minors violates the principle. Ethical interpretation proceeds from an
abstract principle or esprit of “American-ness”—“fairness,” “autonomy,” “liberty,” “nondegradation,” or others—to its concrete instantiation.24
Bobbitt invited his readers to find more methods25 and several scholars
have added to, refined, or modified Bobbitt’s typology over the years.
Michael Moore, for example, catalogued “ordinary meaning[ ],” original
“intention[ ],” “precedent,” and “values” as relevant methods,26 and other
scholars have often emphasized “moral” forms of interpretive argument.27
Akhil Amar identified “intratextualism” as a distinctive method that “use[s]
the Constitution as its own dictionary.”28 Richard Fallon discerned what he
called the “constructivist coherence” method, which integrates various methods into a composite and assigns a hierarchical order to resolve problems of
incommensurability.29 Jack Balkin reconceived the project of offering practical “arguments” as one of providing “styles of justification,” and offered
eleven different justificatory styles.30 Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison distinguished “[h]istorical [g]loss.”31 Jamal Greene descried “pathetic” argument.32 Ian Bartrum argued that evolution in meaning occurs in blending
methods.33
In the spirit of Bobbitt’s invitation, this Article identifies traditionalist
interpretation as a new method. Of course, arguments invoking tradition in
constitutional doctrine are not new. What is new is the isolation of a distinctive and consistent interpretive method—traditionalist interpretation—in
23 See id. at 142–43.
24 See id. at 90 (autonomy), 94 (American-ness), 126 (liberty), 135–36 (fairness), 143
(nondegradation).
25 Id. at 8.
26 Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 286
(1985).
27 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 254–58 (1986); JAMES E. FLEMING,
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS 73–98 (2015).
28 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789 (1999).
29 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192–93 (1987); see also Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1753–54 (1994) (arguing that there are “multiple
legitimate methods of interpreting the Constitution”). For Bobbitt’s view of the incommensurability of the methods, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 117
(1991).
30 Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641,
658–60 (2013).
31 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 417.
32 See Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389,
1395–97 (2013) (identifying “appeals to emotion” as a distinctive argumentative mode).
33 Ian C. Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities: Meditations on Bobbitt’s Theory of the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 157, 160 (2008).
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the doctrine. As used in this Article, a tradition is a political or cultural practice of considerable age that endures over time.34 As Edward Shils has put it,
“[e]very human action and belief has a career behind it,”35 and a tradition
represents the reenactment of distinctive political and cultural practices
across such a “career.” The mere fact of a practice’s past occurrence is insufficient, however. That practice must also be deemed an authoritative piece
of evidence for present interpretive purposes. It must exert some authority
in the legal understanding of a text’s meaning.36 Thus, traditionalism finds
the existence of a political or cultural practice to be legally authoritative in
some degree for the interpretation of the Constitution today.37 The older
and the more continuous the practice has been across time, the more powerful the argument from tradition becomes, though it never becomes an indefeasible reason for an interpretation.38
When the Court interprets traditionally, it focuses on the age and endurance of particular practices rather than on an abstracted idea of tradition.
Sometimes the Justices use the existence or absence of a tradition to uphold
a law’s constitutionality; sometimes to strike it down; and sometimes they simply examine the argument, narrowing or broadening a tradition to include
or exclude a practice, or defending or criticizing a tradition’s interpretive
authority. But traditionalist interpretation appears in a broad range of cases
across the constitutional canon. And the Court’s reasons for interpreting
traditionally also reflect recurrent concerns and purposes.
An initial case may be helpful as an introduction. I have chosen an
example from the Court’s First Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence, in part because it reflects a relatively recent example, but more importantly because the impact of traditionalism as distinguished from other
methods is clear.
In Town of Greece v. Galloway,39 the Court evaluated the constitutionality
of the practice of legislative prayer. A municipality in northern New York
began its town meetings with a prayer by members of local congregations.40
Thirty years earlier, the Court had concluded in Marsh v. Chambers that legislative prayer at the state level was compatible with the Establishment
Clause.41
The major theme in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court reaffirming
Marsh was the relevance of the practice of legislative prayer for the meaning
of the Establishment Clause. The practice, the Court said, has existed contin34 For discussion of the relationship of practices and traditions, see ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 187–203 (3d ed. 2007).
35 EDWARD SHILS, TRADITION 43 (1981).
36 This is what Martin Krygier has called the “presence of the past.” Martin Krygier,
Law as Tradition, 5 LAW & PHIL. 237, 248 (1986).
37 See id. at 243.
38 Krygier writes that “transmission” is requisite for a tradition. Id. at 250–51.
39 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
40 Id. at 1816.
41 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791–92 (1983).
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uously over three distinct periods: during the colonial period, at the ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and afterward.42 The Court
highlighted both the age of the practice and its continuity. “The First Congress made it an early item of business to appoint and pay official chaplains,
and both the House and Senate have maintained the office virtually uninterrupted since that time”43—the same Congress that approved the language of
the Establishment Clause. Legislative prayer endured in the federal and state
governments thereafter, as a “majority of the other States” also maintained
the “same, consistent practice.”44 The Court described the practice as “part
of our heritage and tradition, part of our expressive idiom”45:
[I]t is not necessary to define the precise boundary of the Establishment
Clause where history shows that the specific practice is permitted. Any test
the Court adopts must acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the
Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political
change.46

Thus, the Court emphasized the age of a political and cultural practice, its
duration across several distinctive periods that included the founding but
persisted thereafter, and its consequent authority for interpreting the Establishment Clause.
While “Marsh is sometimes described as ‘carving out an exception’ to
the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence,” inasmuch as none of the
usual Establishment Clause “tests” applied, “[t]he Court in Marsh found
those tests unnecessary because history supported the conclusion that legislative invocations are compatible with the Establishment Clause.”47 It is with
tradition, rather than with abstract tests or principles, the Court suggested,
that Establishment Clause analysis begins, and, under certain circumstances,
ends. The Court thus differentiated a rule-based or principled style of interpretation from a practice-dependent approach. The disagreement between
the majority and dissent was in the description of the tradition and whether
the town’s prayer fell within it, but not about the relevance of the method.48
Narrowing a tradition to exclude, or broadening it to include, the practice
under review is common in traditionalist interpretation. It is the way in
which the Court can change a tradition; it is traditionalist interpretation’s
dynamic feature.
42 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818–19, 1823.
43 Id. at 1818.
44 Id. at 1819.
45 Id. at 1825 (plurality opinion).
46 Id. at 1819 (majority opinion).
47 Id. at 1818 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
48 See id. at 1841–42 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the approach in Marsh
“upholding the Nebraska Legislature’s tradition of beginning each session with a chaplain’s prayer” but finding that the practice in Town of Greece should be distinguished from
it).
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Town of Greece is useful for distinguishing traditionalism from other
methods. The decision also depends on precedential argument, since the
Court relies on and extends the reasoning in Marsh v. Chambers. Its reliance
on Marsh certainly is an example of argument from precedent, but that does
not distinguish Town of Greece from any other case where the Court relies on
precedent. If the Court in Marsh had adopted another Establishment Clause
approach—applying the Lemon test,49 the endorsement test,50 or another
test51—the Court’s reliance on Marsh would also have reflected precedential
interpretation. But the result in Town of Greece is dictated by something more
than the bare precedent of Marsh: it is the substance of Marsh’s reasoning—
that an ancient and enduring political and cultural practice is authority for
the meaning of the text today—that controls the outcome.52
Traditionalism is also different than methods that depend upon principles or moral views (such as ethical argument). It is more like their obverse.
Principled interpretation proceeds from an abstract principle derived from
an even broader worldview to a conclusion about the meaning of the Constitution.53 Traditionalist interpretation moves instead from the age and duration of a political or cultural practice to a conclusion about the meaning of
the Constitution. It would be an example of principled interpretation to
claim that the principle of “separation of church and state” or government
“neutrality” as to religion and nonreligion requires the conclusion that legislative prayer violates the Establishment Clause. Traditionalism, by contrast,
takes the age and endurance of the concrete practice of legislative prayer to
be an ingredient of the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, traditionalist and principled interpretation are not only different but also in tension. The Court is motivated by certain concerns or purposes when it interprets traditionally, even if the Justices rarely explain
themselves. One can discern these purposes in the Court’s observation that
any principle or abstract test that cannot account for a political or cultural
practice like legislative prayer is suspect and incapable of capturing the full
49 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
50 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593–94 (1989).
51 For discussion of the variety of approaches to interpreting the Establishment
Clause, see Marc O. DeGirolami, The Bloating of the Constitution: Equality and the US Establishment Clause, in THE SOCIAL EQUALITY OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 226 (Alan Carling ed., 2016).
52 John Stinneford observes, rightly I think, that traditionalism was once the model for
the common law and that judges engaged in common-law adjudication aimed to reflect
longstanding political practices in the law. See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of
“Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739,
1745–46 (2008). While this view of the common law may have been powerful in the past,
precedential or “common law constitutionalist” approaches today emphasize purely judicial developments and need take no view at all on the interpretive force of political and
cultural practices. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 375–76.
53 See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 11, at 159–60 (deriving the conclusion in Roe v. Wade
from the “ethos” of limited government and the principle that “[g]overnment may not
coerce intimate acts”).
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meaning of the Constitution.54 Traditionalism often reflects this conflict
between practices and principles.55 The Court interprets traditionally to protect cultural and political practices of long standing against principled arguments or abstract tests that would defeat them. Traditionalist interpreters
suppose that arguments from principle often go wrong in failing to account
for—and, in consequence, marginalizing—worthwhile, settled, and enduring
features of popular, lived experience. When the Court interprets the Constitution traditionally, it is expressing skepticism about principled arguments as
exclusive and direct guides to constitutional interpretation.
Some scholars have explored methods of interpretation that appear similar to traditionalism or are perhaps even examples of it. Curtis Bradley and
Trevor Morrison, for example, have argued that “historical gloss” is an interpretive method specifically applicable to separation-of-powers issues.56 They
take as their central example of historical gloss Justice Frankfurter’s famous
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,57 in which he emphasized the “gloss which life has written upon” the words of Article II, so as to
interpret the scope of the executive power more flexibly than a rigorously
textual approach would permit.58 But Professors Bradley and Morrison are
explicit that arguments about historical gloss do not encompass claims about
tradition in the rights context or in situations where one branch is not acquiescing to the practices of a competitor department. They sharply distinguish
“governmental practices” from “general social practices or beliefs.”59
Yet this limitation has several drawbacks. First, hard distinctions
between governmental practices and general social practices can be artificial.60 It is often possible to describe a political practice as “social,” “governmental,” and “political.” Legislative prayer, state-sponsored religious
displays, government speech, tax exemptions for religious institutions,
speech restrictions in polling places,61 and many others are all “governmen54 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014).
55 See MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2013), for discussion of the “tragic” conflicts of theory and practice in constitutional interpretation; and see
also PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2011)
(exploring “empathetic” approaches to religious freedom in order to mitigate these conflicts). For a broader exploration of the conflict between theory and practice, see ARTHUR
M. MELZER, PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN THE LINES: THE LOST HISTORY OF ESOTERIC WRITING
168–81 (2014).
56 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 416. For further refinements, see Curtis A.
Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 69–79 (2017); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel,
After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 56–69.
57 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 418 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
58 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610.
59 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 416.
60 See Baude, supra note 3, at 50–51 (“Structure was supposed to have the effect of
protecting individual rights, and rights sometimes have a structural component.” (footnote
omitted)).
61 For further discussion of these issues, see infra Section II.B.
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tal practices.” If the Court’s justifications for interpreting traditionally
remain relatively constant across different sorts of governmental practices,
then there is reason to study traditionalism as a unified phenomenon across
that range.
Second, the authors claim that relying on historical gloss in the separation-of-powers context “does not typically raise concerns about the oppression of minorities or other disadvantaged groups the way that it does in some
individual rights areas.”62 Here there are two problems. First, those concerns may not always apply in the way the authors fear. Congressional acquiescence to the executive on matters of immigration, to take only one
example, may implicate such concerns. Conversely, the Court’s reliance on
traditions of excluded categories of unprotected speech to vindicate free
speech claims may empower minorities. Second, while such worries may be
reasons to respond differently to the use of traditionalism in these respective
contexts, they may obscure that historical gloss may be only one feature of a
larger interpretive approach.
Third, even within the domain of the powers of government, one may
observe traditionalist arguments in cases that do not also concern interbranch acquiescence.63 There does not seem to be any reason to segregate
historical gloss arguments in interbranch acquiescence cases from other
cases involving traditionalist arguments about the powers of the federal government. They may all be part of the same interpretive method.
Finally, Bradley and Morrison’s particular focus prevents them from seeing the full range of reasons for the Court’s attraction to traditionalist interpretation. In a part of their paper concerning justifications for historical
gloss, they identify “Burkean [v]alues” and the risks of change, the law’s legitimacy, and reliance interests of government and institutional actors.64 But
this Article has already noted that in Town of Greece, the Court relied on the
tradition of legislative prayer as constitutive of the Establishment Clause’s
meaning for at least three other reasons. First, the Court was thereby expressing skepticism about purely principle- or abstract-test-governed constitutional interpretation.65 It was protecting a concrete expression of lived
experience against what might well have been the practice’s invalidation
under a principled approach.66 Second, traditionalist interpreters focus on
what they take to be distinctively American practices of long duration.67
Antitraditionalist interpreters are more open to the contemporary moral and
policy views of certain other nations and international bodies. Third, there
was a sense that reliance on enduring practices simply is one of the ways in
which we come to understand the meaning of unclear text.68 This is a dis62 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 416.
63 See, e.g., infra subsection II.A.3 (discussing the Speech or Debate Clause).
64 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 455–61.
65 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014).
66 For further criticism of “Burkean” justifications, see infra Section IV.A.
67 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818.
68 Id. at 1819.
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tinctive justification involving the nature of interpretation. The Court’s traditionalist or antitraditionalist interpretation—whether in cases concerning the
powers of government or the rights of the individual—often reflects these
concerns, ones that are masked by constraining the inquiry to specific separation-of-powers issues.69
Other scholars have discussed traditionalist interpretation in discrete
areas, most notably Professor Michael McConnell in the Court’s substantive
due process cases about assisted suicide.70 Indeed, McConnell has done
more than anyone to describe what a traditionalist method might entail in
the area of substantive due process, calling it “inductive and experiential”
and contrasting it with moral or philosophical interpretive methods.71 He
has argued that the use of longstanding customs to guide the resolution of
moral and political disagreement in constitutional law is generally likely to
result in “correct” outcomes and is also democratically justified.72 Yet as penetrating as McConnell’s insights about tradition have been, they do not concern traditionalism comprehensively, across constitutional law. Indeed, in
early work, McConnell criticized the interpretive method in Marsh v. Chambers as “fr[eezing] into place the conclusions reached at the time of the framing about the application of constitutional principles to concrete
situations.”73 But as will be seen, what McConnell describes in the due process context is the same interpretive method that he once objected to in the
Establishment Clause context.
In what follows, this Article highlights those areas in which tradition has
been most powerful across the domains of constitutional law. Or, more precisely, where the Court has relied on a political or cultural practice of substantial duration presumptively to inform constitutional meaning.
II. THE TRADITIONS

OF

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

This Part creates an initial division of “government powers traditions,”
“Bill of Rights traditions,” and “Fourteenth Amendment traditions,” because
each of these three components of the Constitution came into being at distinctive historical periods, and age and duration are important features of
the traditionalist method. The aim is not to record every use of the word
“tradition” in the Court’s cases—uses that are sometimes casual or even mis69 For further discussion of the “national” and “universal” tension in traditionalist and
antitraditionalist interpretation, see infra Section IV.B.
70 McConnell, The Right to Die, supra note 2, at 670–73; see also DEGIROLAMI, supra note
55, at 3 (describing an approach to religion clause conflict dependent on traditionalist
interpretation); Steven D. Smith, Separation as a Tradition, 18 J.L. & POL. 215, 234–73
(2002) (discussing the relevance of tradition in understanding separation of church and
state and religious freedom).
71 McConnell, The Right to Die, supra note 2, at 672.
72 Id. at 682–84.
73 Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 362
(1988).
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leading.74 Instead, the Article uncovers when the Court believes there is a
genuine political or cultural practice of long and consistent duration that is
presumptively constitutive of the meaning of constitutional text.
A. Government Powers Traditions
This Article focuses on Articles I and II of the Constitution, beginning
with Article II because the Court has interpreted traditionally most distinctly
there. The overlap between precedential and traditionalist methods is sometimes considerable in Article III, and other articles are omitted for the sake
of space. While the meat of this Article’s evidence for traditionalism comes
from the Court’s civil rights cases, several government powers cases stand out
as especially traditionalist.
1. Article II—Appointment and Removal
Executive branch appointment and removal cases have been dense areas
for traditionalism. The Court’s most traditionalist appointments decision is
NLRB v. Noel Canning, concerning whether the phrase “during the Recess” in
the Recess Appointments Clause75 authorized the President to make appointments within congressional sessions or only between formal sessions of Congress.76 In a 5–4 majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court
concluded that the President may make recess appointments while Congress
is in session.77
The influence of enduring government practices on the Court’s decision
was significant. Relying on Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in McCulloch v.
Maryland that the “longstanding ‘practice of the government’ ” must inform
the Court’s role,78 the Court emphasized that “[l]ong settled and established
practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions.”79 In the Court’s first attempt to interpret the Recess
Appointments Clause in more than 200 years, it wrote, “we must hesitate to
upset the compromises and working arrangements that the elected branches
of Government themselves have reached,”80 notwithstanding the strong
originalist argument to the contrary.
Once the Court found the text ambiguous,81 its “broader interpretation”
indicated that “three-quarters of a century of settled practice” in which Presi74 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 203–07 (discussing Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573 (1980)).
75 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
76 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014).
77 Id. at 2556–57, 2567.
78 Id. at 2560 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819)).
79 Id. at 2559 (alteration in original) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655,
689 (1929)).
80 Id. at 2560.
81 An interpreter drawn to traditionalism may be more likely to find textual ambiguity
in any given piece of text more quickly and easily than an interpreter who is skeptical of
traditionalism.
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dents had overwhelmingly favored the broader construction and the Senate
had largely acquiesced in that construction “is long enough to entitle a practice” to “great” interpretive weight.82 In truth, three-quarters of a century is
not too long as a traditionalist interpreter measures time. Compare, for
example, the age and duration of the practice of legislative prayer in Town of
Greece. Yet what seems to matter to the Court is not only age but also the
preponderance or uniformity of the interpretive preference within the relevant span—its concentration—which the Court emphasized was heavy and
consistent.
Justice Scalia argued in his concurrence in the judgment that traditionalist interpretation is unavailing in the face of plain meaning directly to the
contrary, for “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power.”83 While both
the Court and Scalia agree that longstanding practices that directly contravene textual commands are constitutionally invalid, the discretion attending
the Court’s finding of textual ambiguity introduces an element of uncertainty
in traditionalist interpretation. A Court that more readily finds ambiguity
will more quickly move to traditionalist methods.
Other writers have claimed Noel Canning as an example of “historical
gloss”84 or “liquidation.”85 It is certainly possible to read the decision in
those terms: the Court does, for example, refer to one of James Madison’s
letters to Spencer Roane that included the phrase “liquidate [and] settle.”86
But this Article argues that the approach adopted by the Court in Noel Canning is consistent with and a component of a much broader interpretive practice across many constitutional domains, including the Court’s decisions
interpreting the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.87 Liquidation and historical gloss are particular expressions or reflections of an interpretive approach that is ubiquitous in the Court’s doctrine.
Executive branch removal issues are also susceptible of traditionalist
interpretation, in part because of the absence of a specific textual provision
governing removal with which a tradition might conflict. In Myers v. United
States, for example, the Court held that the President alone had the power to
remove a purely executive officer, such as a postmaster first class.88 After
82 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560–61, 2564.
83 Id. at 2594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008)).
84 See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 56, at 2.
85 Baude, supra note 3, at 49.
86 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Spencer
Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 447, 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1908)).
87 One difference between the method of “liquidation” as described by Professor
Baude and traditionalism is that Baude emphasizes the importance of (judicial) rejustifying or rerationalizing liquidated practices each time a court affirms them. Traditionalism
eschews that rationalistic premise. See Baude, supra note 3, at 16–17. For further discussion of Professor Baude’s work on liquidation and its relationship to traditionalism, see
infra note 313.
88 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
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examining founding-era evidence concerning the removal power, including
long debates resulting in the “decision of 1789,” reflecting the view that the
removal power was tied to Article II’s Vesting Clause and had not been taken
away by any constitutional provision, the Court noted that Congress had followed the plenary view of executive removal authority in the Decision of 1789
in legislation “for seventy-four years.”89 Learned commentary in the nineteenth century by Joseph Story, James Kent, and others confirmed this view,
as did Supreme Court decisions of the period.90
But the practice was not uniform. It was not followed during the
post–Civil War era, where President Andrew Johnson and the Reconstruction
Congress had “heated political difference[s]” leading to the Tenure of Office
Act, which required senatorial consent before removals could be made permanent.91 This departure was a rough patch in what was otherwise a fairly
smooth history of continuity, but the Court marginalized the Johnsonian
period as aberrant and one of “extremes,” and therefore outside the relevant
tradition.92 Yet this move is instructive because a tradition’s authority diminishes as it becomes more difficult to bracket nonconforming evidence.
Some of the Court’s subsequent removal decisions have not followed
Myers’s interpretive lead, opting instead for a balancing test that weighs
whether a congressional limitation on the executive removal power “unduly
trammels” on the executive’s authority.93 But a more recent removal decision, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, represents a shift back toward traditionalism. There, the Court considered “a new situation not yet encountered”—
namely, whether Congress could “layer[ ]” limitations on the executive’s
removal power, restricting the President’s ability to remove an inferior
officer, who in turn was restricted in his ability to remove an inferior
officer.94 While the Court recognized that since its 1935 decision in
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, it had consistently upheld various congressional restrictions on the executive’s removal power, it was the
“novel[ty]” of Congress’s regime that rendered it constitutionally
problematic.95
The Court’s Free Enterprise Fund opinion is a strong example of narrowing a tradition to exclude the practice being reviewed. The Court rejected
the claim that the pragmatic advantages of technocratic expertise warranted
a more flexible approach; quoting then-Judge Kavanaugh, the Court said:
“Perhaps the most telling indication of the severe constitutional problem
with the [Public Company Accounting Oversight Board] is the lack of historical precedent for this entity. . . . [No one] has located any historical ana89 Id. at 145.
90 Id. at 146–49.
91 Id. at 175–76.
92 Id. at 175.
93 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
94 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84
(2010).
95 Id. at 493–96 (discussing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)).
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logues for this novel structure.”96 The novelty of the scheme brought it
outside the protective ambit of existing congressional limitations on the executive removal power. If a presumption in favor of longstanding cultural and
political practices reflects traditionalism’s preservationist side, a corresponding presumption against entirely novel political and cultural arrangements
reflects its skeptical side.
2. Article II—Inherent Executive Authority
As in the case of removal, when the executive acts in ways not provided
in Article II or otherwise authorized by Congress, traditionalist interpretation
may be more likely than in cases where the Court is confronted by unambiguous text, though even then, courts inclined toward traditionalism are likely to
find ambiguity. Justice Frankfurter’s approach in Youngstown to interpreting
the President’s power in these circumstances, which accords substantial
weight to “[d]eeply . . . traditional ways of conducting government” and a
“systematic, unbroken, executive practice” to which Congress has long acquiesced, speaks explicitly in traditionalist terms.97
But an earlier case concerning inherent executive power may be the
clearest example of traditionalism in this area. In United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., the Court considered whether President Taft could withdraw federal
land from development in the face of a statute authorizing its private development.98 Justice Lamar’s majority opinion did not consider whether “as an
original question” the executive withdrawal was constitutional because “[t]he
case can be determined on other grounds and in light of the legal consequences flowing from a long continued practice to make orders like the one
here involved.”99 This executive practice dated “from an early period in the
history of the government”100 and included “[s]cores and hundreds of these
orders” over “the past 80 years.”101 It was affirmed in a mid-nineteenth-century decision102 and ratified repeatedly by executive officials.103
In response to the objection that an enduring tradition does “not establish its validity,” the Court explained:
96 Id. at 505 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d
667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)).
97 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610, 613 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
327–28 (1936) (“A . . . practice . . . evidenced not by only occasional instances, but marked
by the movement of a steady stream for a century and a half of time, goes a long way in the
direction of proving the presence of unassailable ground for the constitutionality of the
practice . . . .”).
98 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 459 (1915).
99 Id. at 469.
100 Id. (quoting Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363, 381 (1868)).
101 Id.
102 See Grisar, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 381–82.
103 See Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 470.
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[G]overnment is a practical affair intended for practical men. . . .
[O]fficers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any longcontinued action of the Executive Department—on the presumption that
unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to
crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not reasoning in a
circle but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the
usage itself . . . .104

The Court’s language highlights a distinctive feature of traditionalism: skepticism that abstract or principled interpretive methods, even if superior in theory and outcome, and even if followed “as an original” matter, should
overcome a long-enduring practice. The practice of executive withdrawal of
lands from development, enduring for many years and in great concentration, “raise[s] a presumption” of its constitutionality against principled arguments to the contrary.105
3. Article I—The Speech or Debate Clause
Article I’s Speech or Debate Clause provides that for “any Speech or
Debate in either House,” members of Congress “shall not be questioned in
any other Place,” but specifically excepts cases of “Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace.”106 In interpreting its scope, the Court held in 1966
that there was little precedent on it “because the tradition of legislative privilege is so well established in our polity.”107 The Court’s first interpretation of
the Clause in 1880, it said, was influenced by a powerful and uniform English
tradition of protection to read the Clause broadly,108 a view the Court reaffirmed in 1951.109 In reading the Clause to prohibit criminal prosecutions
for conspiracy to receive remuneration in exchange for a speech in the legislative chamber, the Johnson Court analogized the issue to “the notorious proceedings of King Charles I against Eliot, Hollis, and Valentine [in 1629] . . .
[where] the Crown was able to imprison members of Commons on charges
of seditious libel and conspiracy to detain the Speaker in the chair to prevent
adjournment.”110
Subsequent Speech or Debate Clause cases sharpened the traditionalist
method. In United States v. Brewster, the Court held that the longstanding
practice of broad protection for statements by legislators did not encompass
bribery prosecutions where there was no danger, in the Court’s view, of inappropriate inquiry into legislative acts or motivation.111 Chief Justice Burger’s
majority opinion narrowed the tradition identified in Johnson: “Although the
104 Id. at 472–73.
105 Id. at 474.
106 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
107 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966).
108 See id. (discussing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)).
109 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378–79 (1951).
110 Johnson, 383 U.S. at 181, 184–85.
111 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512–13, 528–29 (1972).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL304.txt

1140

unknown

Seq: 18

notre dame law review

28-FEB-20

12:32

[vol. 95:3

Speech or Debate Clause’s historic roots are in English history, it must be
interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context of the
American constitutional scheme of government rather than the English parliamentary system.”112 Brewster is notable in two respects: First, it is a clear
example of narrowing to exclude the practice under review from the broader
tradition—a common technique of traditionalist interpretation.113 Second,
the Court’s emphasis on what it believes is the distinctively “American” character of a tradition, which it contrasts with the practices of other nations, is
also a recurrent feature.
4. Article I—The Pocket Veto and Presentment
The pocket veto is the name for the process when a bill does not become
a law because the President does not sign it within the ten days allocated to
him and Congress adjourns before their expiration.114 In the Pocket Veto
Case, the Court held that the President must return the bill to the appropriate house of Congress while it is in session, and not to a designated agent
during the adjournment.115 “No light is thrown,” the Court said, “on the
meaning of the constitutional provision in the proceedings and debates of
the Constitutional Convention,” and no judicial decision had interpreted the
particular issue presented to the Court.116 Originalist and precedential
interpretation were unavailing. Instead, the Court’s holding “accord[ed]
with the long established practice of both Houses of Congress to receive
messages from the President while they are in session.”117 Congress’s practice after ratification—encompassing more than 400 bills and resolutions and
adhered to by all Presidents confronting the issue—had been uniform with
only one exception in 1868, where Congress had considered, but ultimately
rejected, allowing Presidential return of a bill to an agent.118 “Long settled . . . practice,” the Court concluded, “is a consideration of great weight in
a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character,”119
even where evidence of original meaning is not available.
The Court adopted a similar approach to a different presentment issue
in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas, where it held that Article I, Section
112 Id. at 508.
113 See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626–27 (1972) (narrowing the
Clause’s scope to exclude protection against immunity from prosecution for private publication of the Pentagon Papers).
114 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“If any Bill shall not be returned by the President
within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same
shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.”).
115 The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 684–85 (1929).
116 Id. at 675–76.
117 Id. at 683.
118 Id. at 685–87, 690–91.
119 Id. at 689.
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7’s requirement that “two thirds of that House”120 must vote to override an
executive veto to make it a law only required a quorum of those present.121
The Court “adversely dispose[d] of [the claim] by merely referring to the
practice to the contrary which has prevailed from the beginning.”122 It
relied on evidence of the original meaning of the Clause, in which two-thirds
of a quorum was the consistent practice adopted for purposes of making
amendments and “has governed as to every amendment to the Constitution
submitted from that day to this,” including an 1898 House vote for what
would eventually become the Seventeenth Amendment.123 But it also “confirm[ed]” its view with much earlier evidence—“by the fact that there is no
indication in the constitutions and laws of the several States existing before
the Constitution . . . that the legislative body which had power to pass a bill
over a veto was any other than the legislative body organized conformably to
law.”124 Finally, the Court emphasized that every state high court to pass on
the issue after ratification had accepted the same practice (“the decisions
have been without difference”).125 Thus, the continuity of this specific practice for validating the vote—one that endured well before, during, and after
constitutional ratification and was uniformly accepted at the federal and state
level—was decisive in interpreting the meaning of “that House.”126
B. Bill of Rights Traditions
The Court’s traditionalist interpretation in its Bill of Rights jurisprudence is rich and varied. Four Amendments in particular—the First (in the
freedoms of speech and religion), Second, Fourth, and Eighth—offer strong
evidence of traditionalism in action or in retreat.
1. First Amendment—The Speech Clause
While the Court has interpreted traditionally in free speech areas involving political patronage,127 the First Amendment interest in attending one’s
own trial,128 legislative recusals,129 and political pamphleteering,130 three
120 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
121 Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 285 (1919).
122 Id. at 279.
123 Id. at 283.
124 Id. at 280–81.
125 Id. at 284–85.
126 Other areas within Article I reflecting traditionalist interpretation are omitted for
the sake of space. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 400–01 (1989) (emphasizing the “traditional ways of conducting government” in interpreting the constitutionality
of delegation of lawmaking power (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
127 Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95–114 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353–60 (1976) (plurality opinion).
128 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564–80 (1980) (plurality
opinion).
129 Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 122–25 (2011).
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Speech Clause contexts stand out: content-based exclusions from free speech
protection, public forum doctrine, and government speech.
The Court has repeatedly relied on traditional content-based exclusions
to resist the narrowing of free speech protection: “From 1791 to the present, . . . our society . . . has permitted restrictions upon the content of
speech in a few limited areas . . . . ‘[T]he freedom of speech’ . . . does not
include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.”131 The Court
emphasizes this range of years because it does not focus on the moment of
enactment, but instead on speech practices that have been continuously
excluded since enactment. These include obscenity, defamation, fighting
words, incitement to violent conduct, fraud, and others.132 The Court has
sometimes narrowed the traditional exclusions, as for obscenity133 and defamation,134 and it has very occasionally added new exclusions.135
More often, however, the Court has refused, in the face of principled or
policy-oriented arguments, to expand the exclusions beyond their traditional
ambit.136 It has rejected as “startling and dangerous” the view that categories
of speech “may be exempted from the First Amendment’s protection without
any long-settled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation” on the basis
of the speech’s social worth.137 Antitraditionalist interpreters take a different
view. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association, for example, that the Court should reserve judgment when it
faces a new technology whose “important societal implications . . . will
become apparent only with time,” is not a traditionalist argument.138 Likewise, Justice Breyer’s dissent rejects traditionalism in arguing that the principle of “protection of children” should inform the Court’s approach to
creating new content-based exclusions.139
One recurring question concerns how to define the relevant practice.
The Court has often insisted on a highly specific description of it. For example, acts of animal cruelty may be excluded notwithstanding their expressive
content, because of their “long history [of prohibition] in American law,
starting with the early settlement of the Colonies.”140 But “depictions of
130 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
131 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992).
132 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).
133 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
134 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 264, 283 (1964).
135 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764–66 (1982) (child pornography). Even here,
however, it has analogized new categories to existing traditional limitations. Id.
136 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 795–96 (2011).
137 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469–70.
138 Brown, 564 U.S. at 806 (Alito, J., concurring). It is useful to highlight Justice Alito’s
nontraditionalist view in this case since he sometimes interprets traditionally in this and
other contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 741–42 (2012) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
139 Brown, 564 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469.
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animal cruelty” are different because “we are unaware of any similar tradition” of exclusion.141 If the government wishes to regulate a new category, it
must identify it as “part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of
proscription.”142 This is once again the antinovelty side of traditionalist
interpretation.
The Court has also interpreted traditionally in its First Amendment public forum doctrine, which specifies rules for different property categories:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens.143

These locations came to be known as “traditional public forum[s]”: property
where the government cannot regulate speech without a compelling interest
in a manner narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.144 Subsequent cases
often narrow the relevant tradition, as in the Court’s “sidewalk
jurisprudence.”145
But the most traditionalist “traditional public forum” case is Burson v.
Freeman, where the Court held that Tennessee’s restrictions on vote solicitation and the display or distribution of campaign materials within one hundred feet of the polling place were constitutional.146 Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion, which was necessary to the judgment, fully explained
the “traditional public forum”:
If the category of “traditional public forum” is to be a tool of analysis . . . it
must remain faithful to its name and derive its content from tradition.
Because restrictions on speech around polling places on election day are as
venerable a part of the American tradition as the secret ballot, [the law]
does not restrict speech in a traditional public forum . . . .147

The ancient and continuous tradition of government restrictions on speech
in polling places, and streets and sidewalks adjacent to them, rendered these
locations nonpublic forums. Statutes restricting such speech had been in use
“[e]ver since the widespread adoption of the secret ballot in the late 19th
141 Id.; see also Brown, 564 U.S. at 795 (“California’s argument would fare better if there
were a longstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to
depictions of violence, but there is none.”).
142 Brown, 564 U.S. at 792.
143 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (describing places “which by long
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate”).
144 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 214 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); accord id. at 196–97 (plurality opinion).
145 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727–28, 731–32 (1990) (plurality
opinion); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178–79 (1983).
146 Burson, 504 U.S. at 193, 211 (plurality opinion).
147 Id. at 214 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL304.txt

1144

unknown

Seq: 22

notre dame law review

28-FEB-20

12:32

[vol. 95:3

century” and “[b]y 1900 at least 34 of the 45 States . . . had enacted such
restrictions.”148
Scalia’s Burson concurrence helpfully distinguished traditionalism from
other methods that rely more casually on historical practices. First, he
argued that the tradition of government regulation of speech in and around
the polling place needed precise articulation. Second, he claimed that traditionalist interpretation was superior to the Court’s “time, place, and manner”
test because the latter was simply a truncated abstraction of the traditions of
government regulation of speech:
This unquestionable tradition could be accommodated, I suppose, by holding laws . . . to be covered by our doctrine of permissible “time, place, and
manner” restrictions upon public forum speech—which doctrine is itself no
more than a reflection of our traditions . . . . [But] that . . . would require
some expansion of (or a unique exception to) th[at doctrine] . . . . It is
doctrinally less confusing to acknowledge that the environs of a polling
place, on election day, are simply not a “traditional public forum” . . . .149

Scalia’s critique of principled or test-driven methods (reminiscent of the
Court’s language in Midwest Oil) is that they are incapable of capturing the
lived practice of government exclusions of this type of speech. By contrast,
Justice Stevens’s Burson dissent attacked traditionalism as “confus[ing] history with necessity, and mistak[ing] the traditional for the indispensable.”150
The existence of a tradition, he argued, has nothing to do with its consistency
with the principles of free speech, for “traditions sometimes support, and
sometimes are superseded by, constitutional rules.”151 For Stevens, supersession occurs where there are “salutary developments,” evolution, and moral
progress: “Much in our political culture, institutions, and practices has
changed since the turn of the century . . . .”152
Last, in the area of government speech, the Court has held that the government has a long and continuous tradition of using monuments to convey
messages to the public.153 “Since ancient times,” the Court said in Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, “kings, emperors, and other rulers have erected statues
of themselves to remind their subjects of their authority and power.”154 Justice Alito’s majority opinion (and his subsequent dissent in Walker v. Texas
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.) emphasized the age and endurance
of these practices before and after the founding: from their ancient origins to

148 Id. at 214–15.
149 Id. at 216.
150 Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 227.
152 Id. at 222; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
817–22 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that traditional categorizations of public forums should not be determinative of the guarantees of the First Amendment).
153 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
154 Id.
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their American embodiment in the Statue of Liberty, the Washington Monument, and the Lincoln Memorial.155
Other government speech cases suggest that the politics of traditionalist
interpretation can run in unexpected directions. In a case about whether
specialty license plates constitute government speech, the majority and dissenting Justices debated the tradition at issue.156 But here, Breyer and other
liberal Justices on the Court relied on the century-old tradition of the states’
practice of using license plates to convey the states’ messages.157 Alito and
some of the conservative Justices argued in dissent that the tradition of government use of specialty license plates was a “recent development” and therefore distinguishable from the more ancient tradition of the use of
monuments to convey government messages.158
2. First Amendment—The Establishment Clause
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause is another fertile area for
traditionalism,159 but this Article again focuses on three areas: state-sponsored religious displays, tax exemptions, and legislative prayer.
As in the government-speech context, the Court’s cases concerning
state-sponsored religious displays reflect deep engagement with traditionalism, in its favor or against it. In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court upheld a Rhode
Island municipality’s composite Christmas holiday display that included a
crèche against an Establishment Clause challenge.160 Against the categorical
view reflected in a “rigid, absolutist” “test” concerning the scope of the Establishment Clause, the Court argued that “[t]he city, like the Congresses and
Presidents, . . . has principally taken note of a significant historical religious
event long celebrated in the Western World. The crèche in the display
depicts the historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a
National Holiday.”161
This tradition of official, government recognition of Christmas in religious displays, one component of an “unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American
life from at least 1789,” suggested to the Court that the tradition of statesponsored religious displays reflects a constitutionally unproblematic govern155 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2259
(2015) (Alito, J., dissenting); Summum, 555 U.S. at 471.
156 Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239.
157 See id. at 2248.
158 Id. at 2256, 2259–60 (Alito, J., dissenting).
159 Two other areas, omitted for the sake of space, in which traditionalism has influenced Establishment Clause interpretation concern Bible reading and prayer in public
schools, and Sunday closing laws. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632–36 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 267–75
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431–45 (1961).
160 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670–71 (1984).
161 Id. at 673, 678–80.
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mental “acknowledgment of our religious heritage.”162 “It would be ironic,”
the Court continued, if inclusion of the crèche “as part of a celebration
acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by
the people, by the Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for 2
centuries,” would violate the Establishment Clause.163 The age of the tradition in combination with its continuous transmission in the United States
over time rendered the display constitutional.164
Justice Brennan’s Lynch dissent objected wholesale to traditionalism:
“[H]istorical acceptance of a particular practice alone is never sufficient to
justify a challenged governmental action, since . . . ‘no one acquires a vested
or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when
that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates
it.’ ”165 Brennan contrasted traditionalism with what he claimed was a superior, principle- or purpose-driven approach: “Attention to the details of history should not blind us to the cardinal purposes of the Establishment
Clause . . . .”166 But he also argued that the tradition in Lynch, if any existed,
should be drawn more narrowly, and that it must include evidence of the
specific practice from the time of textual ratification: “[A]t the time of the
adoption of . . . the Bill of Rights, there was no settled pattern of celebrating
Christmas, either as a purely religious holiday or as a public event.”167 These
two claims—that traditionalism is illegitimate, on the one hand, or that the
drawing of a tradition must be narrower, on the other—represent recurring
external and internal critiques of traditionalism (though the latter may simply be a purer form of it).
Subsequent religious display cases reflect similar disagreements. In
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, for example, the Court struck down the display
of a crèche inside a county courthouse during the Christmas holiday season.168 Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion acknowledged strong American
traditions of official recognition of the country’s religious heritage but
emphasized that these can never contravene the Establishment Clause’s
broad “adjudicatory principles that realize their full meaning only after their
application to a series of concrete cases.”169 Justice Kennedy’s partial concurrence is a perfect contrast: any test adopted by the Court, he argued, must
generate results consistent with traditional practices, and any test or principle
that would invalidate centuries-old traditions cannot be trusted as the proper
reading of the Establishment Clause.170
162 Id. at 674, 677.
163 Id. at 686.
164 Id. at 687.
165 Id. at 718 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678
(1970)).
166 Id. at 719.
167 Id. at 720.
168 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601–02 (1989).
169 Id. at 606; see id. at 604–05.
170 Id. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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Most recently, the Court approached a traditionalist method most nearly
in American Legion v. American Humanist Association, which concerned the constitutionality of a thirty-two-foot cross that local residents in Prince George’s
County, Maryland, had dedicated in 1925 to honor the county’s fallen
soldiers in World War I.171 In upholding the cross against an Establishment
Clause challenge, a majority of the Court held that “monuments, symbols, or
practices that were first established long ago” are imbued with multiple purposes and meanings.172 “The passage of time,” the Court said, “gives rise to a
strong presumption of constitutionality.”173 The plurality opinion as well as
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence (which Justice Thomas joined) would have
gone further, adopting an approach for state-sponsored religious displays
that took a monument’s participation within a “tradition long followed” in
American government as evidence of its constitutionality or, as Gorsuch put
it, “a practice consistent with our nation’s traditions is just as permissible
whether undertaken today or 94 years ago.”174
American Legion is a fragmented and perplexing decision, in part because
though a majority of the Justices expressed some support for an Establishment Clause methodology that looks to history and tradition, they could not
reach consensus either about the method’s details or its justifications. Nevertheless, it seems that at least some of the Justices are haltingly but steadily
moving toward a more fully articulated account of traditionalism, though
they have yet to articulate any explanations or justifications for it.
With respect to government funding issues, the Court’s most traditionalist decisions have come in the area of tax exemptions for religious institutions. Tax exemptions represent financial benefits to religious institutions
and would be problematic if the Establishment Clause required absolute
financial separation of church and state or neutrality as to religion. Yet tax
exemption has been defended on the basis that it represents ancient and
enduring practical arrangements between ecclesial and secular authorities.175 The Court elaborated this defense in Walz v. Tax Commission, but the
most thoroughgoing traditionalist defense of tax exemptions for religious
institutions appears in an unlikely place: Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion arguing that traditions dating to the founding and enduring continu171 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2076–77 (2019) (plurality
opinion).
172 Id. at 2082.
173 Id. at 2085.
174 Id. at 2088 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014)); id.
at 2102 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (describing a new “history and tradition” approach adopted by the Court).
175 See DEGIROLAMI, supra note 55, at 196–97, 203; see also JOHN WITTE JR., GOD’S JOUST,
GOD’S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 257 (2006) (asserting that
tradition-based arguments may “bolster a broader rationale for upholding traditional features of a public religion and a religious public,” and, in turn, might well justify
“[i]nnocuous long-standing practices . . . such as religious tax exemptions”).
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ously thereafter are of “considerable import” when interpreting “abstract
constitutional language.”176
A final Establishment Clause area worth revisiting is legislative prayer,
where the Court has interpreted traditionally as clearly as anywhere.177 A
later circuit court disagreement about how to apply Town of Greece’s methodology illustrates some interpretive questions about traditionalist interpretation. A panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a local school board whose opensession meetings included a prayer was operating outside the tradition of
legislative prayer recognized in Town of Greece.178 Prayer at a school board
meeting could not be a cognizable tradition, in the panel’s view, because
public schools did not exist at the founding.179 In connection with a denial
of rehearing en banc, Judge O’Scannlain (joined by seven active judges)
issued a statement disagreeing that “an unbroken historical pattern of the
precise practice at issue” is required;180 the question was instead whether the
practice “fits within the tradition long followed.”181
The disagreement is instructive for two reasons. The first is the nowfamiliar problem of how broadly or narrowly to define a tradition. The second concerns the relevance of a tradition’s existence or absence at the time
that its textual source was enacted into law. Political and cultural traditions
that are continuous and concentrated before, during, and after ratification
are particularly powerful. Traditions with less continuity, or that may not
even have been followed at the time their ostensible textual anchors were
enacted into law, are more complicated. Whether evidence of the practice at
the ratification of a clause is required, or whether the tradition may comprise
exclusively postratification practices, is uncertain.
3. First Amendment—The Free Exercise Clause
Unlike the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause has infrequently been interpreted traditionally. Perhaps the best example of traditionalism in the religious exemption context is Justice Harlan’s concurrence
in Welsh v. United States,182 where the Court concluded that a conscientious
176 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see id. at
684–85 (drawing the historical lineage of the practice of tax exemption to the Jefferson
administration and Madison’s tenure in the Virginia Assembly); see also Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 (1973) (discussing Walz and noting
the “apparently universal approval” of tax exemptions before and after the adoption of the
First Amendment, while acknowledging that “historical acceptance without more would
not alone have sufficed” for constitutional purposes).
177 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); see supra text accompanying
notes 39–46.
178 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
896 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), reh’g denied, 910 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 2018).
179 Id. at 1148.
180 Freedom from Religion Found., 910 F.3d at 1303 (O’Scannlain, J., respecting the denial
of rehearing en banc).
181 Id. at 1143 (emphasis added) (quoting Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819).
182 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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objector’s nontheistic views about killing were sufficient to exempt him from
military service under a statutory exemption for religious objectors. Harlan
argued that the statute’s limited exemption for theistic believers violated the
Free Exercise Clause: “The policy of exempting religious conscientious objectors is one of longstanding tradition in this country . . . . It dates back to
colonial times and has been perpetuated in state and federal conscription
statutes.”183 But he also concluded that “[w]hen a policy has roots so deeply
embedded in history,” courts have a “compelling reason . . . to hazard the
necessary statutory repairs”—that is, by “building” on what Harlan took to be
a healthy tradition.184 Harlan thus highlights a dynamic feature of traditionalism: the capacity of judges to build on a tradition by expanding or updating
it.185
4. Second Amendment
The Second Amendment is more rapidly canvassed than the First, since
the Court has only recently begun to interpret it. But the existing doctrine
helpfully distinguishes originalism from traditionalism. The seminal case is
District of Columbia v. Heller, where the Court employed originalist methods to
conclude that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep
and bear arms.186 Justice Scalia’s evidence of the text’s original meaning
included a comparison to other constitutional provisions using the same language; founding-era dictionaries; Blackstone’s Commentaries and other
learned authorities; state constitutional provisions before and after ratification of the Second Amendment; evidence of founding-era idiomatic meaning; and evidence from the ratification debates.187
But the Court also relied on much earlier evidence from the period
between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution of 1688.188 And it
highlighted postratification commentary, caselaw, and legislation through
the late nineteenth century that supported the Court’s interpretation of the
Clause, noting that “the examination of a variety of legal and other sources to
determine the public understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratification” is “a critical tool of constitutional interpretation.”189
Finally, it argued that “longstanding prohibitions,” developed through the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries—such as those on “the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” and on “the carrying of firearms in sensi183 Id. at 365–67 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
184 Id. at 366.
185 The Court has also arguably embraced traditionalism in its ministerial exception
doctrine. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
182–87 (2012).
186 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008).
187 Id. at 579–86, 598–603.
188 Id. at 592. See generally Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Glorious Revolution to American
Revolution: The English Origin of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397
(2019) (providing a detailed preratification history of the “right to bear Arms”).
189 Heller, 554 U.S. at 605.
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tive places such as schools and government buildings”—as well as “laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,”
were constitutional qualifications of the right.190 So, too, was the “historical
tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual
weapons.’ ”191
The relationship of traditionalism to originalism is complex, since
originalism is an umbrella term encompassing several distinctive
approaches.192 Still, one can discern in Heller some differences between
originalism’s emphasis on meaning that may be extracted from sources at (or
immediately preceding and postdating) ratification, on the one hand, and
meaning that is derived from particular political, legal, or cultural practices
that predate and, especially, postdate ratification by a wide margin and continue over time. After Heller, a panel of the D.C. Circuit upheld the District
of Columbia’s narrower ban on most semiautomatic rifles and its firearms
registration requirements against a Second Amendment challenge.193 In dissent, then-Judge Kavanaugh argued that the District of Columbia’s registration requirement was not “within the class of traditional, ‘longstanding’ gun
regulations in the United States” postdating ratification and existing in a continuous pattern since then.194 “[T]radition,” Kavanaugh explained, is synonymous with “post-ratification history,” and tradition, rather than the Court’s
more familiar tiers-of-scrutiny approach, was the applicable “test” for evaluating the constitutionality of municipal gun laws.195
5. Fourth Amendment—Warrantless Seizures
Fourth Amendment doctrine frequently depends upon on minute particulars and practices. It is therefore highly amenable to traditionalist interpretation, and this Article can only focus on a few representative decisions.
Two warrantless seizure cases offer clear examples of traditionalism and
direct criticisms of it.
In United States v. Watson the Court upheld a federal statute authorizing
postal inspectors to make warrantless felony arrests upon probable cause.196
The Court explored whether that power fit within the “ancient common-law
rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not
committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the
arrest.”197 Writing for the Court, Justice White traced the practice back to
several state constitutions as well as to nineteenth-century state caselaw and
190 Id. at 626–27.
191 Id. at 627 (citing sources from 1769 through 1874).
192 See Marc O. DeGirolami, The Vanity of Dogmatizing, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 201, 217
(2010) (book review).
193 See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
194 Id. at 1270 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
195 See id. at 1272–73, 1274 n.6.
196 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
197 Id. at 418.
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statutes.198 He emphasized that “in 1792 Congress invested United States
marshals and their deputies with ‘the same powers’ ” of arrest that state sheriffs and their deputies enjoyed in their respective states.199 Furthermore, the
Second Congress’s statute “equating the power of federal marshals with those
of local sheriffs was several times re-enacted” in 1795, 1861, 1874, and
1935.200 The warrantless felony arrest on probable cause “appears in almost
all of the States in the form of express statutory authorization.”201 The Court
therefore declined to constitutionalize a requirement of warrant-backed
searches “when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long
been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause.”202
If Watson is an exemplar of traditionalism, Payton v. New York is quite
different. There, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the
police from making warrantless and nonconsensual entries into a suspect’s
home, without exigent circumstances, to make a felony arrest.203 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion noted that the “principles reflected in the [Fourth]
Amendment . . . ‘apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employés of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”204 Thus,
notwithstanding substantial evidence—that the common-law practice dating
from at least the sixteenth century was to allow constables to make entry into
homes for the purpose of arresting suspected felons; that the colonial and
founding periods generally followed this practice; that there were no constitutional challenges to the practice throughout the nineteenth century;205
and that twenty-four of fifty states at the time the Court heard the case continued to permit warrantless entry into the home to arrest206—Stevens concluded that “neither history nor this Nation’s experience requires us to
disregard the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”207
While the Payton Court used the word “tradition” to describe the principle of the “sanctity of the home,” its method was not traditionalist but ethical
or principle driven. It embraced the abstract idea—what it called a “basic
principle”—of the “sanctity of the home” said to represent an American
ethos to strike down the governmental practice of arrest supported by centuries of continuous history. Justice White’s Payton dissent, like his Watson
majority opinion, instead is traditionalist because it traced the continuity and
endurance of a practice through the colonial, founding, nineteenth century,
198 Id. at 419.
199 Id. at 420 (quoting Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat. 264, 265 (repealed 1795)).
200 Id. at 420–21, 421 nn.9–10.
201 Id. at 421–22.
202 Id. at 423.
203 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
204 Id. at 585 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
205 Id. at 605–12 (White, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 600 (majority opinion).
207 Id. at 601.
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and modern period. The lesson of Payton is that using the word “tradition”
does not necessarily make an opinion traditionalist.
6. Eighth Amendment—The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is
worth mentioning briefly because it reflects traditionalism largely in retreat.
In its capital punishment cases, for example, the Court focuses first on the
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”208 The Court sees its role as making “an assessment of contemporary
values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction,”209 irrespective of
that sanction’s historical warrant or duration of use. “[S]tandards of
decency,” the Court has explained, encompass changes in other countries
and international bodies felt by the Court to be persuasive.210 The Court
then evaluates for itself whether the practice accords with “the dignity of
man,” the “basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.”211
Applying these methods in an opinion for the Court on the constitutionality of capital punishment for offenders under the age of eighteen, Justice
Kennedy held that “objective indicia of consensus” suggested that the states
had been gradually but steadily abolishing the death penalty within the preceding fifteen years,212 and that the “civilized nations of the world” and the
relevant “world community” were in accord.213 The Court’s “independent
judgment” embraced the “principle” that capital punishment must be limited
to those who evince the greatest culpability.214 It relied on certain sociological studies—confirming, in its view, what “any parent knows”—that those
under eighteen are comparatively immature, easily influenced, and morally
unformed.215 The American “heritage of freedom,” the Court concluded,
required striking down this practice.216
Thus, in this area, the Court focuses on recent trends it believes it can
discern in state law, on a consensus that it believes is justified morally and
may be supported by the decisions of other countries and international bodies that it approves, and on social scientific studies that support its evolving
moral intuitions and sense of American ideals. None of these doctrinal
moves reflects traditionalist interpretation. It is true that the Court’s most
recent Eighth Amendment case, concerning the constitutionality of a state’s
lethal injection procedure, reflects a methodology more in line with tradi208 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
209 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion).
210 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561, 575–76 (2005).
211 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
212 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–67.
213 Id. at 575 (first quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 102; and then quoting Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 316–17 n.21 (2002)).
214 Id. at 564, 568.
215 Id. at 569–71.
216 Id. at 578.
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tionalism (though arguably reaching an erroneous result under that
method), but the case is to this point a methodological outlier.217
C. Fourteenth Amendment Traditions
The Fourteenth Amendment is a study in contrasts. Some of the Court’s
most thoroughly traditionalist opinions appear in its Due Process Clause doctrine. Yet the Court’s Equal Protection Clause doctrine is often highly antitraditionalist. While the Court interprets other Amendments traditionally as
well,218 this first attempt at describing traditionalism focuses on the major
examples of it, and against it, in the Court’s Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence.219
As early as 1855—in interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause—the Court observed that if a particular legal process does not conflict with the constitutional text, the Court must look to “settled usages and
modes of proceeding” in the common and statute law of England to see
whether the challenged practice comports with the Constitution’s due process protections.220 In Murray’s Lessee, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a particular type of nonjudicial warrant authorized by Congress,
holding that since the founding of the English monarchy, summary methods
for the recovery of debts due to the Crown had been accepted, practices that
had been replicated in the colonies and in the states before and after ratification of the Constitution.221
This early example and others holding that due process is satisfied by
following legal practices that accord with the “law of the land”222 suggest that
it is better to avoid the relatively recent division of the Due Process Clause
217 See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1122–25, 1128 (2019). For criticism of
Bucklew on traditionalist grounds, see Samuel Bray, What Bucklew Doesn’t Say, REASON (Apr.
3, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/04/03/what-bucklew-doesnt-say/ (reproducing comments from Professor John Stinneford).
218 The question arises whether traditionalism becomes less relevant for recently ratified Amendments, since there will be less historical continuity to draw from in their interpretation. Yet the Court’s early interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause adopted traditionalist methods, so there is no reason that an Amendment’s
recency prevents it from being interpreted traditionally.
219 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has also been interpreted traditionally. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724–29 (1988); see also id.
at 740–43 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing
the majority for failing to explain why tradition should allow states to continue to engage
in practices that are unfair).
220 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277
(1856).
221 Id. at 278–80.
222 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 540–41 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (giving examples of state constitutions defining due process with respect to “the law of the
land”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL304.txt

1154

unknown

Seq: 32

notre dame law review

28-FEB-20

12:32

[vol. 95:3

into “procedural” and “substantive” components.223 Instead, this Article
selects five concrete practices—personal jurisdiction, punitive damages,
rights of defendants in criminal proceedings, incorporation, and physicianassisted suicide and the rights of intimacy—that illustrate the Court’s use of
traditionalist interpretation in this area.
1. Due Process Clause—Personal Jurisdiction
Since 1940, the Court has argued that “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice” set the constitutional limits of a state’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants not physically present in the
state,224 but it was only fifty years later in Burnham v. Superior Court that the
Court explained what “traditional” contributed to this formulation.225
There, it evaluated whether a state could always assert personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who was physically present within the state.226 Justice
Scalia’s plurality opinion traced the power over the defendant’s person as far
back as the English Year Books of the fifteenth century through the seventeenth-century decision of Lord Coke concerning the Court of Marshalsea’s
jurisdiction over the king’s household and domestics.227 The Burnham plurality argued that when the Court held in Pennoyer v. Neff in 1878 that the
judgment of a court lacking personal jurisdiction violated the Due Process
Clause, that holding was simply continuous with and a ratification of the
traditional practice adopted by many states before passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was in turn continuous with and a ratification of the tradition in previous English law.228
Over a series of twentieth-century decisions, however, the Court steadily
relaxed Pennoyer’s strict territorial rule of jurisdiction to account for changes
in technology, communication, and interstate business activity. But that
approach did not apply where a defendant was physically present in the state:
The distinction between what is needed to support novel procedures and
what is needed to sustain traditional ones is fundamental . . . . [J]urisdiction
based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of

223 These usages date to the 1930s and 1940s. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
137 (1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“Procedural due process has to do with the manner of
the trial . . . .”); Republic Nat. Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (designating certain rights of property as ones of “substantive due process”).
224 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (referencing the “traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice” standard).
225 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 618–22 (1990) (plurality opinion).
226 Id. at 607–08.
227 Id. at 608–09. The Year Books are English law reports spanning the late thirteenth
through the early sixteenth centuries.
228 Id. at 609 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722–33 (1878)).
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the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process
standard of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”229

The Burnham plurality rejected Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion that
“contemporary” ideas of “fairness” rather than “traditional” ones should control, responding that “contemporary notions of due process” just exactly are
the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” that “are generally
applied and have always been applied in the United States.”230 The practice’s “validation is its pedigree,” rendered even more powerful because it was
followed by many states.231
2. Due Process Clause—Punitive Damages Awards
The Court has used a similar approach to evaluate due process limits on
punitive damage awards. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the
Court held that states that had adopted the common-law method for assessing punitive damage awards—in which “a jury [was] instructed to consider
the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct”—
had not per se violated the Due Process Clause.232 The Court observed that
“Blackstone appears to have noted” the use of punitive damages, that they
were employed by state courts in the late eighteenth century, and that they
“have long been a part of traditional state tort law.”233 Because the commonlaw method was “well established before the Fourteenth Amendment was
enacted,” and because nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to
change that practice, it was constitutional.234 But the Haslip majority cautioned that “general concerns of reasonableness” might warrant disturbing
the common-law rule where a punitive damage award seemed excessive to
the Court.235
Justice Scalia’s Haslip concurrence reflects a more committed example
of traditionalist interpretation. After providing a more complete historical
account of the prevalence of the common-law rule of absolute jury discretion
in assessing punitive damages in the period before and after ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Scalia critiqued the majority’s “decoup[ling]”
of the concept of “fundamental fairness” from the prior inquiry about
whether the practice at issue was “traditional”: “ ‘fairness’ in the abstract,”
and disconnected from the view that traditional practices long approved are
themselves fair (provided they do not violate other constitutional provisions),
is, Scalia claimed, a contemporary perversion of due process.236 Yet subse229 Id. at 619; cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (arguing that traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice “can be as readily offended by the perpetuation
of ancient forms that are no longer justified”).
230 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 623–27 (plurality opinion).
231 Id. at 621.
232 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991).
233 Id. at 15 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984)).
234 Id. at 17–18.
235 Id. at 18.
236 Id. at 34–38 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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quent decisions have emphasized that the traditional practice of punitive
damages awards is only presumptive evidence of the scope of the Due Process
Clause.237
3. Due Process Clause—Rights of Defendants in Criminal Proceedings
The Court has sometimes interpreted traditionally in cases about due
process limits concerning the rights of criminal defendants. In the nineteenth century, Murray’s Lessee involved this category of issue,238 as did
Hurtado v. California, where the Court held that arrest and conviction without
a grand jury indictment did not violate due process.239 The Hurtado Court
explained that while a state that follows a traditional practice always satisfies
due process, that did not mean that when a state uses a new conviction practice it fails to accord due process: “[T]o hold that such a characteristic is
essential to due process of law, would be to . . . stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians.”240 Likewise, in Ownbey v. Morgan, the Court held that a state did not
violate due process by permitting an out-of-state creditor to attach the property of an in-state debtor without an opportunity to be heard.241 The Court
traced the practice to eighteenth-century England, through the colonial and
founding periods, and through to the practices commonly used by states in
the nineteenth century: “A procedure customarily employed, long before the
Revolution, in the commercial metropolis of England, and generally adopted
by the States as suited to their circumstances and needs, cannot be deemed
inconsistent with due process of law.”242
Several mid-twentieth-century decisions in this area adopted an antitraditionalist approach, however. In Gideon v. Wainright, for example, the Court
held that the failure to appoint counsel in certain criminal cases violated the
Sixth Amendment as incorporated against the states by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment irrespective of whether the practice of
appointing counsel was traditionally followed.243 Likewise, in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp. of Bayview, a case involving a due process challenge to the
practice of prejudgment garnishment of wages without an opportunity to be
heard, the practice’s long pedigree and continuity were deemed irrelevant.244 As Justice Douglas cracked: “The fact that a procedure would pass
muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to
237 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426, 429 (2003).
238 See supra text accompanying notes 220–21.
239 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
240 Id. at 528–29.
241 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111–12 (1921).
242 Id. at 111; see also Corn Exch. Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1930) (“The
challenged procedure is an ancient one.”).
243 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963); see also Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 343, 346–47 (1976) (discussing “fairness and reliability” as well as various
public policy concerns).
244 See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339–42 (1969).
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all property in its modern forms.”245 While in some more recent cases, the
Court has veered back toward traditionalism,246 its use of tradition in this
area has been erratic—consistently applied early on, far less frequently in its
mid-twentieth-century cases, and more regularly thereafter.
4. Due Process Clause—Incorporation
For purposes of this Article, the Court’s use of the Due Process Clause as
the vehicle for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states will be
taken as settled.247 Instead, the question is what approach the Court uses in
deciding whether to incorporate a provision of the Bill of Rights against the
states. When it has interpreted traditionally in this area, the Court has sometimes been less careful than elsewhere.
As early as 1897, the Court argued that the Bill of Rights “[was] not
intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to
embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our
English ancestors.”248 Therefore, when the Court began its “selective incorporation” of the Bill of Rights in the twentieth century,249 it often assumed
the traditional status of the particular practices at issue. It consequently has
interpreted the scope of some of these incorporated rights more expansively
than was warranted by their traditional scope. So, for example, the Court
included some discussion of the practice’s nature, age, and continuity when
it incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in capital cases250 and
the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal cases.251 Yet by the
Court’s own admission, the evidence it marshaled for an expansive right to a
jury trial in criminal cases was “skeletal.”252
However, the Court’s two most recent incorporation decisions are highly
traditionalist. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, incorporating the Second
Amendment against the states,253 the Court inquired whether the right to
keep and bear arms was “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty”—
that is “fundamental from an American perspective”254—emphasizing that a
right “deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition” offers a strong case for
245 Id. at 340.
246 See, e.g., Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1996) (plurality opinion).
247 For debate, see generally CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS,
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
(2015); KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014).
248 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
249 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763 (2010).
250 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67–69 (1932).
251 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968).
252 Id. at 153; see also id. at 183–92 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (refuting the majority’s argument for an expansive right).
253 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750.
254 Id. at 767; id. at 784 (plurality opinion).
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incorporation.255 The Court focused on ratification debates as well as postratification evidence in the states showing the continuity of the practice—and
especially its salience for African Americans after the Civil War.256 Likewise,
in Timbs v. Indiana, decided last Term, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the
Court incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
emphasized its “venerable lineage,” tracing its age to Magna Carta and its
duration through the Stuart Restoration, the English Bill of Rights, the American colonial period, the state constitutions (where excessive fines were
largely proscribed), and the concurrence of thirty-five of thirty-seven states in
the nineteenth century—an enduring and dense tradition before and after
ratification of both the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendment.257 The
practice of protection against excessive fines, the Court said, is a “constant
shield throughout Anglo-American history.”258
5. Due Process Clause—Physician-Assisted Suicide and Rights of
Marriage/Intimacy
As is well known, the Court began to find new rights of sexual autonomy
protected by the Due Process Clause in 1965, when in Griswold v. Connecticut
it held that states could not prohibit married couples from obtaining contraceptives.259 In this and subsequent cases, the Court generally has not interpreted traditionally.260
But it has done so twice—once concerning the rights of sexual autonomy, and a second time about the right to physician-assisted suicide. First, in
Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court held that a state statute criminalizing consensual sodomy was constitutional.261 The Court emphasized that the right to
engage in consensual sodomy was not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition” because it
was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the
original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union
had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy,
and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting
adults.262
255 Id. at 767–80 (majority opinion) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
721 (1997)).
256 Id. at 768–78.
257 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687–88 (2019).
258 Id. at 689.
259 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
260 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118 n.2 (1973) (dismissing evidence that many
states in the nineteenth century had statutes similar to Texas’s respecting abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
261 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
262 Id. at 192–94 (footnotes omitted).
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The unwillingness of the Bowers Court to “take a more expansive view” of the
scope of due process foreclosed it from recognizing a new constitutional
right.263
Second, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court articulated a traditionalist
framework for evaluating the scope of due process.264 The case concerned
whether a state statute prohibiting assisted suicide violated the Due Process
Clause.265 To determine whether a practice warrants protection, (1) the
right must be “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ ”; and (2) the Court must “careful[ly] descri[be]” the practice.266 The
Court described it narrowly. The issue was not whether there is a “right to
die,” or a “liberty to choose how to die,” or a “liberty to shape death,” but
instead the existence of a right to assistance in committing suicide, in this
case by a medical professional.267 Applying that standard, the Court refused
to recognize the right in light of the “consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to
reject it today . . . . To hold for respondents, [it] would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy
choice of almost every State.”268 The Court declined to extend what the
respondents urged were “the broad, individualistic principles” reflected in
the Court’s “liberty jurisprudence.”269 It described Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health,270 involving the issue of whether competent patients have the
right to refuse medical treatment, as a traditionalist rather than a principledriven decision.271
Bowers and Glucksberg reflect fundamentally similar methods, and they
mirror the Court’s approach in other areas where it has interpreted traditionally. Yet the Court rejected Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, and, indeed,
appeared to reject traditionalism itself, arguing that only laws and views of
the last half century are relevant to the Court’s due process analysis, and that
while deeply rooted traditions may be considered, they neither exhaust the
Court’s inquiry nor decide its judgment.272 A moral principle inherent in
the word “liberty” overcame the tradition of proscription. While traditionalist interpretation still controls for physician-assisted suicide, the Court has
qualified its influence in cases involving what it has described as “other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.”273 The Court’s “better
263 Id. at 194.
264 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
265 Id. at 705–06.
266 Id. at 720–21 (first quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (plurality opinion); and then quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
267 Id. at 722–23 (rejecting the various framings of the issue provided by the Ninth
Circuit and respondents).
268 Id. at 723.
269 Id. at 724.
270 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
271 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
272 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–75 (2003).
273 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
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informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty
that remains urgent in our own era,” far more than “history and tradition,” is
the touchstone for due process rights in this area.274 Thus, while the Court
begins with a presumption that traditional practices comport with the Due
Process Clause, in the area of “marriage and intimacy,” that presumption is
easily overcome by principled arguments against the tradition that the Court
finds compelling. In other due process areas, the presumption is stronger.
6. Equal Protection Clause
This Article concludes its doctrinal exploration with the Equal Protection Clause because, like the Eighth Amendment, this is also an area notable
for antitraditionalist interpretation. As even Justice Scalia acknowledged, the
Equal Protection Clause “might be thought to have some counter-historical
content.”275 If the Due Process Clause has sometimes been the traditionalist
side of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause is its radical, even revolutionary, side.
In the area of race-based discrimination, some early cases interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause adopted seemingly traditionalist methods. For
example, in Plessy v. Ferguson, in upholding the constitutionality of racially
segregated railway cars, the Court stated a statute’s consistency with the
Equal Protection Clause depended on the “established usages, customs and
traditions of the people”—here, of the southern states.276 Yet the Court did
not trace the age and endurance of segregation from preratification to the
late nineteenth century.277 It acknowledged that many states had adopted
differing practices and relied on what it claimed were innate “racial instincts”
and “distinctions based upon physical differences.”278
Later, however, the Court firmly repudiated traditionalist interpretation.
Brown v. Board of Education relied on prudential, sociological, and moral considerations for doing away with the “separate but equal” rule, not tradition.279 The Court has “not hesitated to strike down an invidious
classification” as violating the Equal Protection Clause “even though it had
history and tradition on its side.”280 Its decision in United States v. Virginia,
striking down Virginia’s all-male military academy, rejected Justice Scalia’s
lone dissenting view, which emphasized the long tradition of men’s military
colleges existing long before and long after ratification of the Fourteenth
274 See id.
275 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
276 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
277 Some older cases suggest that racial segregation in railway cars was not traditional.
See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445, 452 (1873).
278 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
279 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. at 489–95.
280 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
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Amendment.281 In this area, tradition is not a strong justification when confronted with a more powerful principle of equality.282
III. ELEMENTS

OF

TRADITIONALISM

The previous Part’s exploration of traditionalist interpretation in the
Court’s cases across the domains of constitutional law is only partial, omitting
or rapidly referencing many areas where the Court has interpreted traditionally. But it is sufficient to distill three basic elements of traditionalism: (1) a
focus on political and cultural practices; (2) the duration of such practices,
understood as a composite of age and continuity (to include concentration
of usage); and (3) the presumptive, but defeasible, interpretive influence of
these practices. This Part discusses these three elements and offers other
observations about traditionalism by comparison with other approaches.
A. Political and Cultural Practices
The chief distinguishing feature of traditionalism is its emphasis on
political and cultural practices for informing constitutional meaning. Sometimes the government itself (federal or state) is engaging in the relevant practice, as in all government powers traditions, legislative prayer, government
speech, tax exemptions for religious institutions, state-sponsored religious
displays, warrantless seizures of felons, rights of defendants in criminal proceedings, punitive damages award regimes, and many others. In these situations, when it interprets traditionally, the Court takes the existence of a
particular government practice to be in some measure283 authoritative for
interpreting the meaning of the Constitution.
At other times, the Court focuses on the government’s regulation of
individuals or groups which themselves engage in specific practices. Such
cases include people or groups who distribute pamphlets advocating political
causes, organize and control the composition of their religious institutions,
make decisions concerning physician-assisted suicide, and so on. In these
situations, when the Court interprets traditionally, it takes the existence of
these practices as, in some degree, authoritative when evaluating whether the
government’s attempts to regulate them are constitutional. But in either
case—whether for government traditions or government regulation of individual or group traditions—it is concrete practices that furnish the raw material for traditionalism.
281 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 556–57 (1996); see also id. at 569, 566–70
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The all-male constitution of [Virginia Military Institute] comes
squarely within . . . tradition.”).
282 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 737–44 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing unsuccessfully for the long tradition of single-sex schooling).
283 “In some measure,” because the defeasibility of the presumption in favor of a tradition depends on what the Court takes to be the strength of countervailing factors, such as
text, moral principles, pragmatic considerations, and the structural imperatives of the particular constitutional clause in question.
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Traditionalism’s emphasis on political and cultural practices raises two
crucial issues for describing the method—the narrowness or breadth of any
given tradition; and the method’s relationship to other prominent interpretive approaches.
First, narrowness and breadth.284 Drawing a tradition too narrowly, as in
the Court’s traditional public forum “sidewalk jurisprudence,”285 may limit
its interpretive power in subsequent cases. Drawing it too broadly may dilute
it, perhaps so much that it begins to look like an idea or principle even if the
Court imprecisely or casually calls it a tradition. This terminological slippage
occurred in Payton v. New York, for example, where the Court called the
“sanctity of the home” both a “tradition[ ]” and a “basic principle.”286
Judges working within a traditionalist framework will often narrow or
broaden a tradition with the aim either to exclude or include the practice
being reviewed. Justice Kagan in Town of Greece v. Galloway and the Ninth
Circuit panel in Freedom from Religion Foundaiton, Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified
School District, for example, argued for a narrowing construction of the tradition of legislative prayer that would exclude the prayer practices in those
cases.287 Likewise, Chief Justice Rehnquist narrowed the tradition of private
decisions affecting the end of life and encompassing the specific practice of
competent refusals of medical treatment so as to exclude physician-assisted
suicide from due process protection.288 And Justice Brennan argued for a
narrowing construction of the tradition of state-sponsored religious displays
in Lynch v. Donnelly to exclude the practice of displays celebrating the Christmas season.289
On the other hand, the Lynch majority opted for a broadening construction of the tradition of state-sponsored religious displays.290 Similarly, Judge
O’Scannlain argued for broadening the tradition of legislative prayer even
without evidence that the practice of prayer in school board meetings
occurred at the founding.291 Narrowing and broadening are recurrent judicial techniques that introduce some uncertainty into traditionalist interpretation.292 There is, of course, a direct analogy to the common-law method: just
as the holding of a case may or may not be extended to encompass the set of
284 For a subtle treatment of “constitutional narrowing” in the lower courts, see Richard
M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2016).
285 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
286 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 601 (1980); id. at 608–12 (White, J.,
dissenting).
287 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1842 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting);
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896
F.3d 1132, 1148 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), reh’g denied, 910 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 2018).
288 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725–28 (1997).
289 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 718–20 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
290 Id. at 686 (majority opinion).
291 Freedom from Religion Found., 910 F.3d at 1301–03 (O’Scannlain, J., respecting the
denial of rehearing en banc).
292 See supra notes 131–39 and accompanying text.
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facts being reviewed, so, too, may a tradition be narrowed or broadened to
encompass or exclude a particular political or cultural practice.
One important question is whether judicial narrowing and broadening
introduces so much uncertainty as to render the method overly manipulable
or even empty. After all, if judges can simply broaden the tradition to
include, or narrow it to exclude, specific practices as they see fit, then perhaps traditionalism offers less interpretive certainty and predictability than is
optimal. This is a sensible criticism, but it can be met with at least three
responses.
First, traditionalism is not unique in this respect. Many interpretive
methods involve a certain degree of underdeterminacy. When courts apply a
principle or a test—the principle of “liberty” in a due process case, for example, or the test of “secular purpose” in an Establishment Clause case, for
another—judges and scholars debate the scope of the principle or the meaning of the test. Similar problems of underdeterminacy afflict pragmatic or
balancing approaches as well, as in the case of the Court’s preferred
approach to executive removal, for example. Varieties of originalism and
nonoriginalism often do not offer determinate answers to questions of application but instead invite interpretive disagreements within the premises of
their methods. Uncertainty and disagreement about meaning is simply in
the nature of interpretation.
Second, while traditionalism is not alone susceptible to these issues, it
may be preferable to methods whose problems of underdeterminacy run
deeper. Traditionalism has the advantage that it focuses judges’ attention on
the concrete. Rather than debating the scope of abstract principles such as
“equality,” “liberty,” or “dignity,” judges are compelled to examine practices
such as pamphleteering, recess appointments, the regulation of speech in
specific locations, and so on. And they are further required to study these
practices in historical perspective, relying on a body of evidence that, though
it may be contested, actually exists to be interpreted.
Third, the narrowing and broadening of traditions by judges interpreting traditionally is not a methodological flaw. Indeed, it is a healthy feature
of the method, inasmuch as it demonstrates traditionalism’s suppleness in
the face of new facts and practices. Narrowing and broadening are techniques that judges who are otherwise inclined to interpret traditionally can
use to adapt or even change traditions, as Justice Harlan emphasized in his
Welsh concurrence.293 Narrowing and broadening introduce a dynamic element into traditionalist interpretation, without which the method would be
overly static and past-dependent. Without narrowing and broadening, traditionalism might, as the Court said in Hurtado, “stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and
Persians.”294
293
294

See supra subsection II.B.3.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884).
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The second issue involves the relationship between traditionalism and
varieties of originalism and nonoriginalism. This Article does not study this
issue in depth and only offers a few summary observations.295 Yet it is possible to say that the traditionalist emphasis on practices rather than principles
differs from prominent types of both originalism and nonoriginalism.
The principal question many originalists ask today is “what does the text
mean?” and they use various techniques to fix its meaning and construct
applications of that meaning.296 The question for most originalists is not “to
what specific practices does the text apply?” For traditionalism, by contrast,
the focus is on the practices that people before, during, and after the Constitution’s drafting did, or did not, believe constituted the meaning of the text.
Traditionalist interpreters believe that the meaning of the text—particularly
the meaning of text that is itself abstract—is better determined and understood by recourse to concrete practices than to still other abstract principles.
Meaning is constituted by practices, though not only by them. New practices
may be enfolded into existing traditions by drawing a tradition more broadly
or excluded by drawing it more narrowly. There may be some overlap
between traditionalism and those varieties of originalism that are receptive to
discerning meaning from practices, including postratification practices,297
but others more interested in the evolution of meaning that categorically
disapprove what they call “expected applications” are in greater disharmony
with traditionalism.298 On the specific issue of determinacy of meaning,
where the original meaning of a provision is fixed and clear, originalism may
be more determinate than what one might get from traditionalist interpretation; this was certainly Justice Scalia’s view in his Noel Canning concurrence.299 On the other hand, depending on the variety of originalism
295 For more detailed comparison, see DeGirolami, supra note 7 (manuscript at 17–28).
296 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory
of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 7–14 (2018); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 458–75 (2013); Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599–603, 607–13 (2004).
297 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–31 (2007); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and
the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which
Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 939
(2009); see also Michael Ramsey, Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment Clause and Original
Expected Applications, ORIGINALISM BLOG (May 6, 2014), https://originalismblog.typepad
.com/the-originalism-blog/2014/05/greece-v-galloway-the-establishment-clause-and-original-expected-applicationsmichael-ramsey.html (“If a very broad consensus at the time of
enactment (or shortly after) thought that provision X did not ban activity Y, that is surely
strong evidence that the original public meaning of X did not ban activity Y.”).
298 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
292–93 (2007). Traditionalist interpretation is not the same as an originalist approach that
emphasizes “expected applications.” It is better described as an exercise in retrospective
application—drawing on old and enduring practices to make constitutional judgments
about the specific practice under review. For further discussion, see DeGirolami, supra
note 7 (manuscript at 17–22).
299 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2600, 2617 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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chosen, originalism may be less clear than traditionalism for more openended textual provisions.
As for species of nonoriginalism, these too are sufficiently numerous
that this Article can only offer a cursory comparative observation. Since
traditionalism takes longstanding and continuous practices to create an
authoritative presumption of meaning, varieties of nonoriginalism that prize
the evolution of meaning based on the elaboration of a principle or abstract
ideal conflict with it. Any interpretive method for which a practice’s age and
duration offer no reason to perpetuate it is antitraditionalist. Nonoriginalist
methods that rely on common-law methods to interpret the Constitution may
be more in keeping with traditionalism and may also face similar criticisms of
underdeterminacy.300
B. Duration
The second element of traditionalism is duration, understood as a composite of age and continuity. Practices derive their interpretive authority on
the basis of their duration: the older the practice, and the more continuous
the practice before, during, and after the ratification of the Constitution, the
more powerful it becomes for constituting the Constitution’s meaning.
Age or antiquity is easily understood. On traditionalist premises, the age
of a practice is authority for its consistency with the Constitution, just as a
practice’s recency or novelty renders a traditionalist interpreter more skeptical about it.301 Generally speaking, the older the better. Sometimes, the
Court refers to a practice’s “immemorial[ ]” antiquity, or its existence “time
out of mind,”302 or its endurance “[s]ince ancient times,”303 or more specifically as one “inherited from our English ancestors,”304 without tracing it to a
particular period. At other moments, however, the Court locates a practice’s
genesis in a specific time and place centuries before the founding era.305
And at still others, the age of the practice is traced only to the ratification of
the constitutional clause at issue.306 Similarly, antitraditionalist interpreters
300 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 884–88 (1996).
301 See the discussion of Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text; and see also Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009) (“There
is no long history of such a right, and ‘[t]he mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough
to doubt that “substantive due process” sustains it.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Reno
v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993))).
302 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.).
303 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
304 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
305 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 182 (2012) (Magna Carta); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008)
(the English Restoration); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 608 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (fifteenth century); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 419–20 (1976) (eighteenth century).
306 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (tracing First Amendment
principles “[f]rom 1791 to the present”).
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often deprecate the antiquity of a practice as irrelevant and focus on contemporary views and attitudes.307
Continuity is somewhat more complicated and may be best understood
metaphorically by thinking of a ski slope. The slope may be smooth with
good snow for skiing from the beginning to the end; or it may be sparse, with
certain snowy sections and others that are bare. Sections of the slope that are
smooth may be especially so—densely packed with snow—or they may be
coated only with a thin layer. A slope that is too sparse can no longer be
skied.
The smoothest type of continuity in traditionalist interpretation is evidence that a practice has been pursued before, during, and after constitutional ratification without significant interruption and in concentrated
ways—in the case of a government practice, by the federal government and
the majority, or even all, of the states. The practice is then completely
smooth, with no sparse patches and with a dense history throughout its duration. Justices interpreting traditionally sometimes have found this sort of
continuity and concentration of usage, as in the areas of physical presence
for personal jurisdiction, tax exemption for religious institutions, legislative
prayer, and others, but perhaps the best example is United States v. Watson,
where after detailing the history of warrantless felony arrests predating and
during the Constitution’s ratification, the Court emphasized congressional
reauthorization of the practice in 1795, 1861, 1874, and 1935308 and
observed that nearly every state had done the same in statutes spanning the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.309 Here the practice is very smooth and
concentrated.310 The sparser a tradition of practice becomes, however, the
less interpretive authority it can muster. Cases with sparser traditions include
Myers v. United States, where the Court had to explain away an entirely different practice of executive removal power after the Civil War,311 as well as
some of the Court’s incorporation decisions and punitive traditions in the
Eighth Amendment context.312
Traditionalism’s emphasis on duration—and in particular its use of postratification evidence of a tradition’s continuity—offers another set of similarities and contrasts with originalism. Like originalism, traditionalism
examines evidence of meaning at, and sometimes just before and after, ratification of the particular constitutional provision—whether 1789, 1791, or
1868 for the sections of the Constitution examined in this Article. But unlike
originalists, traditionalist interpreters take evidence of a practice’s endurance
307 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594–99 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 567–72 (2003).
308 Watson, 423 U.S at 418–20, 421 nn.9–10.
309 See id. at 421–22.
310 For other smooth and concentrated traditions, see supra text accompanying notes
76–80, 120–25, 257–58 (discussing NLRB v. Noel Canning, Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
Kansas, and Timbs v. Indiana, respectively).
311 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175–76 (1926).
312 For discussion of these issues, see supra subsections II.C.4 and II.B.6, respectively.
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well before—even centuries before—ratification to be relevant. They also,
unlike originalists, rely heavily on a practice’s continuity after textual ratification (including well after it) as authority for its constitutionality.313 This difference appears in the Pocket Veto Case, where evidence of meaning at the
founding was unavailable,314 as well as in the Court’s Heller decision, though
Justice Scalia does not distinguish originalist evidence from traditionalist evidence.315 But it is highlighted helpfully by then-Judge Kavanaugh in his
post-Heller D.C. Circuit dissenting opinion, which emphasized that postratification evidence is properly individuated as traditionalist.316
Thus, traditionalism and originalism might diverge along at least three
axes involving the weight each gives to different types of evidence of constitutional meaning over time. First, the weight of evidence of original meaning
is less for traditionalism than it is for originalism. Second, the weight of preratification evidence of meaning is greater for traditionalism than for originalism. Third, the weight of postratification evidence of meaning is greater—
perhaps comparatively greater than it is along the second axis—for traditionalism than it is for originalism.
When either age or continuity is questionable, the power of traditionalism diminishes. But these two dimensions of duration can also be conceived
on a sliding scale. In Noel Canning, for example the age of the practice of
recess appointments relied on by the Court was not particularly impressive.317 But the Court nevertheless found a less-than-powerful practice when
measured by age alone to control the outcome because of the high concentration of the practice during the relevant period.318 The ski slope was short
313 William Baude argues that “[l]iquidation was a specific way of looking at postFounding practice to settle constitutional disputes, and it can be used today to make historical practice in constitutional law less slippery, less capacious, and more precise.” Baude,
supra note 3, at 4. Professor Baude traces the idea of liquidation to the views of James
Madison’s Federalist No. 37, where Madison argued that a long course of practice could
“settle” a constitutional question where the text was indeterminate. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 269 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)).
This Article’s project is different from Professor Baude’s, since it aims to describe a
method as it has existed and currently exists in the Court’s interpretive practice, while
Baude focuses on a historical argument advanced by Madison and its utility today. Id. at 1.
Baude claims some of the decisions described here as traditionalist—such as Noel Canning—as examples of liquidation, and he largely avoids discussion of what liquidation
might mean for the Court’s civil rights jurisprudence. Id. at 6–7. He also describes “tradition” in a way different than used in this Article, as a pragmatic and principled grounding
for liquidation. Id. at 44–47. Nevertheless, it is an interesting question whether the
Court’s long and pervasive use of traditionalist interpretation is consistent with the method
Baude describes, or whether liquidation is an example of traditionalist interpretation.
314 See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 688–91 (1929).
315 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598–603 (2008).
316 See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1273–74, 1274 nn.6–7 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
317 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2564 (2014) (noting three-quarters of a
century of practice).
318 Id.
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but very densely packed with snow. Something similar occurred in Midwest
Oil.319 The components of age and continuity sometimes interact with one
another: as evidence for one becomes stronger, evidence for the other need
not be quite as strong. But traditionalist interpreters always account for both
components of duration in according authority to the practices they believe
influence constitutional meaning.320
An important open question about duration concerns cases where a tradition, at least when described narrowly, does not exist at all at the time of
the constitutional text’s ratification but subsequently comes into being. The
legislative prayer cases and opinions—the Town of Greece dissent, for example,
as well as the Ninth Circuit panel opinion and statement by Judge
O’Scannlain in Chino Valley Unified School District—present such a situation.321
So does the Pocket Veto Case.322 These cases can be approached by narrowing
and broadening the tradition, but they also point to an unresolved issue
about duration in traditionalist interpretation: that is, whether particular
patches of sparsity in the tradition’s duration, such as at the time of ratification, are more significant or damaging to the tradition’s authority than other
sparse patches before or after ratification.
C. Presumptive but Defeasible Influence
The final component of traditionalism is that a tradition is given a very
strong presumption of validity that nevertheless sometimes may be overcome
by other considerations. The Court speaks explicitly about this presumption
in favor of a tradition in several cases examined in this Article, including
Dames & Moore v. Regan,323 Midwest Oil,324 Haslip,325 and Campbell.326
But in a much larger range of cases, even if the Court or particular Justices interpreting traditionally do not use the word “presumption,” they make
clear that the interpretive strength of a tradition may be overcome by other
weightier considerations. One, of course, is text that directly conflicts with a
tradition. Justice Scalia made this point in his Noel Canning concurrence
(one that was not disputed in principle by the majority, though in practice it
319 See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469–72 (1915).
320 Another question not addressed by this Article concerns precisely how much evidence of continuity there must be in order for a practice to become a tradition.
321 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1845–46 (2017) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
910 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 2018) (O’Scannlain, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en
banc).
322 See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 688–91 (1929).
323 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).
324 See supra text accompanying notes 98–105.
325 See supra text accompanying notes 232–35.
326 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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was neatly sidestepped by finding ambiguity rather quickly)327 as well as in
his Haslip concurrence, where he explained:
Let me be clear about the scope of the principle I am applying. It does not
say that every practice sanctioned by history is constitutional. . . . [T]he principle I apply today does not reject our cases holding that procedures
demanded by the Bill of Rights . . . must be provided despite historical practice to the contrary.328

“[N]o practice . . . inconsistent with constitutional protections,” as Justice
Powell said in his Watson concurrence, “can be saved merely by appeal to
[historical] acceptance.”329
What the Court takes to be a particularly strong moral principle can also
overcome the presumption in favor of a tradition. For example, the Court’s
traditionalist interpretation of the scope of due process in Bowers v. Hardwick
gave way in Lawrence v. Texas to what the Court believed was a stronger and
more vital constitutional principle of liberty protecting intimate activity.330
By contrast, the Court in Glucksberg deemed the practice of physician-assisted
suicide not to warrant due process protection on traditionalist grounds, and
it did not find a moral principle strong enough to overcome the presumption.331 But in Obergefell, the Court made clear that traditionalism has no
role in its “marriage and intimacy” due process doctrine.332 Likewise, “general concerns of reasonableness,” as the majority put it in Haslip, might overcome the presumption in appropriate circumstances.333 These may be
powerful moral principles, but they may also be powerful pragmatic or policyoriented considerations. In other due process areas not implicating these
issues—personal jurisdiction, the rights of defendants in criminal proceedings, and others—the presumption in favor of traditionalism seems stronger.
Outside of areas concerning marital and intimate conduct (where the
Court has made its position plain), an important open issue is the relative
strength of the presumption in favor of a tradition with respect to the areas
studied in this Article. While a comprehensive evaluation of that question
must await another study, one salient variable concerns the history and purposes of the specific constitutional clause at issue.
The contrast between the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause is instructive in this respect. While the Court has determined that the
function of the former is progressive and oriented to the abstract idea of
equality, it has long observed that the scope of the latter is informed by
“[the] law of the land.”334 Invoking tradition as a justification for interpret327
see id.
328
329
330
331
332
333
334

NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592, 2600 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring);
at 2564 (majority opinion).
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 430 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
See supra text accompanying notes 261–63, 272.
See supra text accompanying notes 264–69.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015)
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
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ing the Equal Protection Clause is highly controversial, as demonstrated by a
current conflict in the circuit courts concerning the constitutionality of
municipal regulations of public toplessness that distinguish between men
and women.335 Indeed, it may be that traditionalism has not been identified
until now because the Court has sometimes used it in embarrassing and
sloppy ways in the Equal Protection Clause context, as it did in Plessy v. Ferguson.336 Constitutional scholars may have missed the larger interpretive
method adopted across constitutional law that was right under their noses,
preferring to imagine that the Court never interprets traditionally any
longer.337
Yet the valences of the Due Process Clause, by contrast, are innately traditionalist, rendering it a much more plausible vehicle than the Equal Protection Clause for traditionalism. Something similar may be said for the
difference between the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. The Court rarely interprets the Free Exercise Clause traditionally, while it does so frequently for the Establishment Clause, and there
is an open question about whether the difference reflects something internal
about the function of these respective provisions. Other constitutional
clauses will have their own structural valences as well.
IV. EXPLAINING TRADITIONALISM
This Article has identified traditionalism as a distinctive method,
described it as practiced by the Supreme Court across the constitutional
canon, and isolated and examined its essential components. While a complete defense of traditionalism is beyond its scope, this Article attempts in
this Part to explain some of the reasons that the Court or its several Justices
adopt it. The Justices almost never explicitly defend appeals to tradition.
They certainly do not say, for example, that they interpret traditionally
because the past must always be followed, or because it is simply what constitutional interpreters do. Sometimes they do not adhere to past practices in
discerning constitutional meaning and sometimes they adopt other interpretive methods. Here, too, they rarely explain themselves or justify their choice
of methods.
This Part of the Article is in consequence more speculative than the
others, inferring certain purposes and justifications from the doctrinal
335 Compare Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2017) (upholding the regulations as consistent with intermediate scrutiny), reh’g denied, 875 F.3d 375, with
Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 916 F.3d 792, 802–05 (10th Cir. 2019)
(striking down the regulations under intermediate scrutiny).
336 See supra text accompanying notes 276–78.
337 For analogous observations in a jurisprudential vein, see Dan Priel, Not All Law Is an
Artifact: Jurisprudence Meets the Common Law, in LAW AS AN ARTIFACT 239, 264–65 (Luka
Burazin et al. eds., 2018) (“The association of the common law with the political theory of
tradition is at least as old as Edmund Burke, if not older. Given this long historical provenance, it is a good question why it has been largely ignored by legal philosophers.” (footnote omitted)).
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deposit. Yet just as Lon Fuller once observed that explanations of “law” “are
not mere images of some datum of experience, but direction posts for the
application of human energies,”338 something similar may be said about
interpretive methods for determining constitutional meaning. To understand an interpretive method, one has to explain its purposes—the reasons
that interpreters are attracted to it, what it is good for, its justifications.
A. Actions (Can) Speak Louder than Words
Traditionalism contrasts most sharply with interpretive approaches that
rely upon the ongoing elaboration of an abstract principle or idea—derived
from underdeterminate text—to derive constitutional meaning, whether
those methods are described as ethical, moral, principled, or test-based.
Judges who have most clearly adopted traditionalist methods—Justice White
in Watson; Justice Lamar in Midwest Oil; Justice Brennan in Walz; Justice Kennedy in Town of Greece; Chief Justice Rehnquist in Glucksberg; Justice Alito in
Summum; Justice Breyer in Noel Canning; Justice Scalia in Burnham, Brown v.
Enterntainment Merchants Association, and Haslip; and then-Judge Kavanaugh
in Heller v. District of Columbia,339 for example—all demonstrate skepticism
about principled, test-driven, or moral approaches to constitutional interpretation that, if applied rigorously, would injure or perhaps destroy a political
or cultural practice.
Test- or principle-driven approaches, as Justice Scalia said in his Burson
concurrence, are often inferior to traditionalist interpretation.340 Either the
test or principle cannot accommodate the tradition; or the test or principle
loses its conceptual cogency if it is expanded to encompass a tradition that
does not properly fit within it. Traditionalist interpreters strongly sense the
conflict between abstract principles and concrete practices, and they adopt
traditionalism because they see value in the latter and wish to protect them
against the former. They believe that actions can sometimes speak louder
than words when it comes to constitutional interpretation, at least when
words do not convey a clear and determinate meaning and are instead susceptible of constructed or even invented meanings. Even more, actions and
practices are constitutive of the words that they instantiate: we could not have
a clear idea about the meaning of the words without recourse to the practices
illustrating them.
Similarly, Justices who most clearly reject traditionalism—Justice Stevens
in Burson; Justice Blackmun in County of Allegheny; Justice Breyer in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association; Justice Brennan in Lynch and Burnham;
Justice Kennedy in Roper and Obergefell; and Justice Douglas in Sniadach and
338 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 632 (1958).
339 For discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 196–202, 98–105,
176, 39–52, 264–71, 153–54, 75–87, 225–31, 136–42, 232–36, and 193–95, respectively.
340 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 214–16 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Levy,341 for example—argue for the primacy of principles and moral ideals
over practices. To depend upon a tradition, as Stevens said in his Burson
dissent, “confuses history with necessity, and mistakes the traditional for the
indispensable.”342 For them, traditions should never defeat principled arguments for the interpretation and expression of the ideals they believe are
latent in the Constitution. Theirs is not only an evolutive conception of constitutional meaning, but also one that favors contemporary concerns and
their own moral evaluations over enduring practices. They believe that traditions that do not conform to or are outrun by principled evaluation should
be abandoned. They are sanguine about the complete union of their favored
principles with constitutional interpretation.343
The question is how best to explain the traditionalist’s skepticism, and
the antitraditionalist’s enthusiasm, about principled interpretation. Again,
the Justices never lay out clearly their justifications for traditionalist interpretation, or the reasons for their high regard for practices over principles, so
some informed guesswork is necessary. Whenever tradition is mentioned,
legal theorists have a tendency to turn reflexively to the eighteenth-century
English politician, Edmund Burke, and to explain appeals to longstanding
practices in more broadly “Burkean” terms reflecting a preference for collective wisdom over philosophical ideals or principles.344 And it is true that
Burke contrasted traditional arrangements and abstract theory in politics and
law.345 Indeed, in prior work, I have explored whether Burke’s incremental
approach to law and politics can help make sense of religion clause theory
and jurisprudence.346
Whatever may be said of Burke himself,347 however, many of the most
prominent strains of contemporary “Burkeanism” in the legal academy are
341 For discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 146–52, 168–70,
136–42, 160–67, 225–31, 212–16, 273–74, 244–45, and 280, respectively.
342 Burson, 504 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
343 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 115, 122
(Amy Gutmann ed., new ed. 2018).
344 See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 426; Strauss, supra note 300, at 891–94;
Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006); Ernest Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 619, 686–88 (1994).
345 See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Reform of the Representation of the Commons in Parliament (June 16, 1784), in 3 THE SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 43,
48 (London, A. Strahan 1816); Edmund Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians
(May 11, 1792), in 5 THE WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 367, 367 (Boston, Charles C. Little &
James Brown 1839); see also Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Introduction: Burke’s Theory of Political
Practice, in SELECTED LETTERS OF EDMUND BURKE 1, 4 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. ed., 1984)
(“If there is one recurrent theme in Burke’s letters, speeches, and writings, it is his emphasis on the moral and political evils that follow upon the intrusion of theory into political
practice.”).
346 See DEGIROLAMI, supra note 55, at 107–20.
347 For a superb discussion of Burke’s traditionalism in the area of church-state relations, see Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Toleration in Edmund Burke’s “Constitution of Freedom,” 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 393.
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highly pragmatic and consequentialist in orientation. Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, has argued that:
Burkeanism does not rest on a belief that the past has any kind of inherent
authority, or on a judgment that people owe some kind of duty to the past,
or the notion that we are in some way constituted by our tradition . . . .
Burkeanism is best justified in pragmatic terms, on the ground that it is
likely to lead to better results than the imaginable alternatives.348

Similarly, Professors Bradley and Morrison claim that “Burkean thinking”
supports the view that “the fact that the political branches have worked out a
particular arrangement through repeated practice over time suggests that it
is normatively desirable.”349
But this second-best, pragmatic, best all-things-considered justification
for “Burkeanism” matches up spottily with what one can infer from the
Court’s use of traditionalism. The Court and its individual Justices often
interpret traditionally because they believe that there is a fundamental conflict between practice-based and principled constitutional interpretation.
This conflict is insoluble and perpetual, and it makes traditionalist interpreters wary of uniting principle extracted from vague constitutional text to constitutional interpretation, lest they disrupt or destroy what they regard as
valuable political and cultural practices.
Yet if the Court sees value in traditions, it is worth asking of exactly what
sort. Whatever value it sees does not seem primarily result oriented. When
the Justices interpret traditionally, they rarely suggest that longstanding practices reflect the best all-things-considered policy today—ones that, for example, a legislator or policymaker would choose independently if starting fresh.
To the contrary, the Court sometimes has suggested that a policymaker
might not choose the practice today if not for its traditional status. Rather,
traditionalism reflects the view that theory and practice can never be united
and that the compulsion to bring them together damages them both. As
Justice Scalia’s Burson concurrence suggested, the practices of law would
become unhealthfully ideologized, while law’s principles would become incoherent.350 Instead, traditionalist interpreters believe that vague or openended constitutional text should be tied to the concrete and lived experience
reflected in American practices. Conversely, antitraditionalists, as Justice Stevens explained in his Burson dissent, view tradition as a distraction from what
is necessary.351 Tradition bestows on what is contingent the appearance of
necessity, settling all of the truly meaningful questions before they are even
raised. Tradition puts principle and reason to sleep.
The traditionalist view, as it is expressed in the Court’s jurisprudence, is
much older than either Burke or Burkeanism. It is, as Arthur Melzer has
348 Sunstein, supra note 344, at 404.
349 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 435.
350 See supra note 340 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the conflicts of
theory and practice, see DEGIROLAMI, supra note 55, at 107–20; MELZER, supra note 55, at
109.
351 See supra text accompanying notes 150–51.
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persuasively argued, a fundamentally premodern view of the relationship of
“theory and praxis”: “[T]he earlier, especially the classical understanding of
theory and praxis, assumed that the philosopher transcended ordinary practical life in a way that put him in tension with it and with the long-standing
customs, myths, and prejudices of his society.”352 When it interprets traditionally, the Court is motivated not by pragmatics or expectations of best allthings-considered outcomes and consequences. It is not trying to harmonize
principle and practice by subsuming the former to the latter, as suggested by
the Burkeans, in an effort to reach the best interpretive outcome that it can
under second-best circumstances.
Rather, the Court seems to be motivated by something like fear. There
may be a “best,” or a second- or third-best interpretation of the Constitution
that reflects an objectively true moral and political order; and there may not
be. Traditionalists can be agnostic on this question and set it aside. They
may believe that traditionalist interpretation reflects, even imperfectly or in a
second-best way, the moral and political beau ideal or the truest meaning of
the Constitution. Or they may be skeptical about the existence of such a
perfect state of affairs, or at least of their own capacity to achieve it. They can
abstain from the cardinal question of best worlds.
But they are not agnostic about the ordinal question. They have a more
definite view about whether there are better and, especially, worse ways to
live than they and their society actually have lived and do live. They believe
that the traditions of American constitutional law have generally (not always,
and with several important exceptions, but at least presumptively) served tolerably well. Traditionalists are particularly worried about worse alternatives
to traditionalism.
It is the fear of what completely principled or fully theorized interpretation will do if given free rein: fear of intolerance; fear of the corrosion of
lived experience; fear of the distortion and usurpation of text to mirror a
certain narrow class of contemporary moral and political views; and fear of a
kind of political and legal doctrinairism unleashed by principled interpretation if carried out comprehensively. Traditionalism is a form of defense
against those (from a traditionalist perspective, unwelcome) possibilities.353
The Court or its Justices interpret traditionally because they worry about what
they regard as far worse political and moral alternatives that they fear will
damage their society if they adopt a fully principled approach to constitutional interpretation.
Antitraditionalist interpreters might at this point well ask why a tradition
that cannot be justified on thoughtful, rational, or principled grounds could
ever be socially salubrious. Of what social benefit is a thoughtless or unreflective tradition? Is it not better discarded?
One response to this set of questions is that “thoughtful” interpretation
in constitutional law has generally meant interpretation that reflects the val352 MELZER, supra note 55, at 138.
353 Thanks to Steven Smith for helpful discussion of the difference between “believing
traditionalists” and “skeptical traditionalists.”
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ues, principles, and predilections of the educational and social elites in
American society. “[T]he thoughtful part of the Nation,” as a plurality of the
Court once put it in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, one of its most antitraditionalist substantive due process opinions, is the part that embraces “applications
of constitutional principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court
before.”354 Yet it is often precisely those new principled applications that
reflect elite moral and political sensibilities and preferences, and that have
been used by the Court to dismantle the existing traditions of nonelites.
Indeed,
[b]eginning in the mid-twentieth century, the Court inserted itself into
[many] cultural and social conflicts—about the nature of the human person, sexual mores, church-state relations, [the nature of freedom and equality,] and many other subjects. It purported to resolve cultural disagreement
by [extracting broad principles of liberty and equality from constitutional
text,] and it earned a certain . . . prestige for its decisions, [by listening for
and] channeling the consensus of an elite constituency.355

Traditionalism is generally a constitutional approach more suited to nonelites in American society—those whose longstanding practices, and the
moral and political commitments they instantiate, may not conform to the
ongoing “thoughtful” reimagination of the Constitution to reflect and
impose elite opinion as a national mandate.
This is not to say that traditionalist interpreters never rely on principles
at all. Sometimes Justices who interpret traditionally in one context interpret
antitraditionally in others. Traditionalists acknowledge, as Professor McConnell put it in his critique of the tradition of legislative prayer, that “like cases
are treated alike, and that those governed by the Constitution [must] understand what is required of them.”356 They agree that sometimes principles
can be useful in achieving these ends.
But they dissent from McConnell’s view that these ends may only be
achieved through purely principled interpretation. Sometimes practices
serve these rule-of-law ends better than principles; they may be more predictable, and more comprehensible, constitutional guides for the governed—
closer to their own experience and more accessible than the airy abstractions
of those whose experience of life is quite different than their own. Sometimes practices serve other desirable ends: we may not see clearly what the
principled ends of constitutional governance require, and in our zeal for the
fulfillment of principled constitutionalism, we may crush or wipe out worthwhile ways of living that do not cohere with them. Traditionalist interpretation thus serves a protective function in the perpetual conflict of practice and
principle. The Court uses traditionalism as a shield against the threat of the
complete philosophication of law, one that antitraditionalist interpreters
354 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
355 Marc O. DeGirolami & Kevin C. Walsh, Kennedy’s Last Term: A Report on the
2017–2018 Supreme Court, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2018, at 31.
356 McConnell, supra note 73, at 363.
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believe is both unnecessary and even positively obstructive and harmful for
making the Constitution the best it can be.
B. The National Before the Universal
Running alongside the conflict of concrete practices and abstract principles is another concerning the national and the universal. Traditionalists are
interested in what they argue are distinctively American traditions as embodied in American practices. As the Court emphasized in both McDonald v. City
of Chicago and Summum, it is “our” “American” traditions that matter for interpretation, not the traditions of other countries or international bodies.357
The Court in United States v. Brewster similarly emphasized the distinctively
“American” inflection of the older, and broader, English tradition of legislative insulation from legal action for “speech or debate.”358 Justice Scalia
stressed the “long usage of our people” in his decisive Burson concurrence as
of particular importance for traditionalism.359
Antitraditionalist interpretation, by contrast, is oriented toward the universal. As the Eighth Amendment capital punishment cases suggest, antitraditionalist interpretation is open to—indeed, sometimes greatly solicitous
of—the contemporary views (though generally not the historical views) of
other nations and international bodies on particular moral or policy matters.
True, traditionalist interpreters often explore historical practices in English
common law, but this is generally in order to construct the pattern of practice that is the basis for a particularly American national tradition. Antitraditionalist interpreters, by contrast, emphasize universally binding principles
and “evolving standards of decency” embraced by all “civilized nations” and
respected international bodies.360 Even in the case of ethical interpretation,
which ostensibly attempts to discern an “American” worldview,361 the focus is
rarely on evidence of anything distinctively or historically American but
instead on those views the author regards as universally attractive.
The division between the national and the universal might be explained
on the basis of democratic politics and institutional dynamics. Traditions—
particularly when they are government traditions—often reflect particular
democratic choices or arrangements supported by popular approval, acceptance, or, at the very least, inertia. When the democratically unaccountable
Court upsets a tradition in favor of a uniform and universal rule that invalidates the tradition, it is arguably acting antidemocratically. So, for example,
Professor McConnell has argued that traditional interpretation and a reliance on “settled judgment[s]” enables judges to “keep faith with the democratic postulates of our system” while also exercising a bit of antimajoritarian
357 See supra notes 253–56, 155 and accompanying text.
358 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972).
359 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 216 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
360 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561, 575–76 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
361 See BOBBITT, supra note 11, at 94.
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intervention where government bodies veer wildly from national consensus.362 There is evidence that traditionalists on the Court sometimes have
this purpose in mind, as when Justice Scalia defends traditionalism because it
“intrudes much less upon the democratic process” than its competitors.363
Yet the emphasis in the Court’s doctrine on the distinctively “American”
quality of traditionalism—of “our people”—and the parallel emphasis in
other cases on the concomitantly distinctive universal or cosmopolitan quality of antitraditionalist interpretation, suggests that there may be more than
an appeal to democratic politics or institutional dynamics at play. Traditionalists adopt a view of the American nation and its practices as legally salient
for constitutional interpretation. They are especially interested in national
limits and national histories as defining the relevant traditions. Antitraditionalists instead think of national practices and histories as, at best, only one
indicium of a larger, universally enlightened set of mores, attitudes, and ideals that ought to influence constitutional interpretation. Traditionalists insist
on national fixedness and specificity, while antitraditionalists insist on political and cultural fluidity and universality.364
Of course, these positions are not rigid, always admit exceptions, and
may be overcome by more important considerations. As already noted, the
presumption in favor of a tradition is powerful, but it may be defeated by
other more powerful concerns—a particularly powerful moral principle, for
example, or a pragmatic necessity—just as antitraditionalist interpreters
often account for and acknowledge the relevance of state practices in interpreting constitutional text.365 But these opposing perspectives do influence
constitutional interpretation as general outlooks. Traditionalists are more
inclined to sense that any society—just in order to be a society—must be in
some sense closed, and that closed societies are constituted by the embedded
and long-lived practices within national boundaries.366 As Mark Lilla has put
it: “Societies since time immemorial have been closed things. That is what
makes them societies.”367 If political and cultural life are often made up of
such traditions, then it follows that traditions impact constitutional interpretation as well.
362 McConnell, The Right to Die, supra note 2, at 685; see id. at 682–85.
363 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
364 For related reflections on the multiple understandings of the concept of “human
dignity,” see Mark L. Movsesian, Of Human Dignities, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1518–19
(2016).
365 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–65; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–17 (2002).
Other Eighth Amendment capital punishment cases where the Court incorporates state
practices also demonstrate this tendency.
366 Joshua Kleinfeld has offered some analogous observations about the socially constitutive function of criminal law in any given society. Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The
Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (2016) (“Reconstructivism
sees criminal law as the defender of a shared moral culture . . . .”).
367 Mark Lilla & Michael Ignatieff, Open Society as an Oxymoron, in RETHINKING OPEN
SOCIETY 19, 19 (Michael Ignatieff & Stefan Roch eds., 2018).
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Antitraditionalists are by contrast inclined to believe that social and cultural fluidity and flux renders the idea of “American” or “our” traditions artificial, narrow, and perhaps even excessively patriotic or prejudiced.
Traditionalism unjustly privileges the national as against the individual. This
is particularly objectionable to antitraditionalists in the context of interpreting the scope of individual rights, where the Court is often said to exercise a
countermajoritarian function, protecting minority rights against democratic
encroachment. But traditionalism also privileges the national against the
universal. Many traditions are constructed for some ulterior, chauvinistic,
and possibly unfair, illegitimate, or hegemonic purpose that may have had
purchase in the distant and less enlightened past (“under a feudal regime,”
as Justice Douglas put it in Sniadach),368 but no longer should today.
“Much in our political culture, institutions, and practices has changed
since the turn of the century,” and changed for the better, as Justice Stevens—perhaps the archetypal antitraditionalist—put it.369 In many cases,
what Americans thought were real or important national traditions have
been cast aside. Some traditions were complete fabrications anyway. They
may have “appear[ed] . . . to be old [but actually were] often quite recent in
origin and sometimes invented.”370 At the very least, antitraditionalists see
traditions as contingent or inessential elements of constitutional
interpretation.
As already noted, it may be that some of these conflicts in outlook have
led constitutional theorists to overlook the pervasiveness of traditionalism in
the Court’s doctrine. “Liquidation,” for example, may or may not be an
example or a manifestation of traditionalism; but if it is, it has not, contrary
to Professor Baude’s view, been ignored by the Court since the time Madison
wrote.371 It is everywhere, ubiquitous in the Court’s doctrine, and it has
been for some time. The Court’s clashes over traditionalist interpretation—
ones that can be inferred from the doctrine—gesture toward much larger
underlying, and perennial, debates about whether political and constitutional morality is truly national or universal.
C. Interpretive Method or Adjudicative Method?
A final somewhat speculative inference from the doctrine is that perhaps
the Court or its Justices are mistaken about the reasons that they look to
tradition. Even though they believe that they are interpreting the Constitution traditionally, what they are actually doing is something else: adjudicating
traditionally. Scholars who distinguish between theories or methods of interpretation and adjudication note that the question of what the document
means is different than the question of how the document should be used by
368 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
369 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 222 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
370 Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1,
1 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 20th prtg. 2012).
371 See Baude, supra note 3, at 69.
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judges deciding cases.372 Certain judicial practices, on this account, have
nothing to do with the meaning of the text, but are instead techniques for
resolving disputes that are exceptions to the meaning of a text. For example,
for those that draw these distinctions, stare decisis is not a feature of constitutional interpretation—the activity of understanding the meaning of the constitutional text—but an exception to it that stabilizes meaning for some other
reason.373 Thus, adjudicative meaning is meaning that judges might themselves recognize as interpretively erroneous but is simply “postulated for the
purposes of deciding a case.”374
The dichotomy between interpretation and adjudication presents the
possibility that when the Justices look to the existence and endurance of traditions, they are engaged in an adjudicative rather than an interpretive enterprise. That is, they know or suspect that the Constitution means something
different than is suggested by a tradition, but they refuse to resolve the case
according to the text’s meaning. Perhaps, for example, they are unwilling to
upset long-settled or well-grounded expectations about meaning, as they
often say they are in following the rule of stare decisis. People have relied on
the existence of a tradition for many years, and the Court no more wishes to
upend those reasonable expectations than it does in the case of a longstanding precedent unless there are strong reasons to do so.
This is certainly a possible explanation for traditionalism. Setting aside
the possibility of intentional misdirection, the Justices simply may not realize
just why they rely on tradition, mistaking the activity of case resolution for
textual interpretation. But if the Court is actually engaged in adjudication
rather than interpretation when it uses traditionalist methods, traditionalist
adjudication may nevertheless have significant implications for other prominent theories. Consider Professor David Strauss’s “common law constitutionalism,” which treats “common law” adjudication as a unified approach to
resolving constitutional cases.375 Strauss claims that “rational traditionalism . . . is the most important part of common law constitutional interpretation,” and he argues that his approach validates the constitutionality of
“relatively new practices” and “precedents” so long as they have achieved
widespread acceptance and are justified on the basis of universal
rationality.376
But if the approach described in this Article is properly conceived as
traditionalist adjudication, then it suggests that Strauss’s case-resolution
method is not unified at all. It breaks up into discrete approaches depending
on the judge’s stance on the practices-principles and national-universal
dichotomies described above. Traditionalist adjudicators might also favor
372 See Gary Lawson, Did Justice Scalia Have a Theory of Interpretation?, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2143, 2145 (2017) (“A theory of interpretation is a theory of meaning.”).
373 Id. at 2155 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 413–14 (2012)).
374 Id.
375 Strauss, supra note 300, at 888.
376 Id. at 879, 892.
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common-law constitutionalism if national practices of long duration are presumed constitutional; but they would reject a common-law constitutionalism
that emphasized the vanguardism and universal rationalism that Strauss
describes as an integral part of his method. Common-law constitutionalism
thus would fragment into what could be termed a maintenance or preservationist model and an improvement or progressive model.
Other problems of judicial self-awareness are possible as well. It is possible, for example, that the Justices are influenced by past practices even when
they do not acknowledge it in their opinions. Conversely, their conscious
and explicit appeal to tradition may be selective, so that even when they purport to be relying on tradition, it is not certain how much influence tradition
has actually had on their decisions.377 It may be that the Justices, or at least
some of them, are not entirely clear about how tradition functions in their
decisionmaking. Here it may be helpful to contrast Justices who are methodologically self-aware or consistent with others whose methodological preferences are more eclectic or, less positively, erratic. Justice Scalia and Justice
Stevens, for example, are relatively consistent in their preference for traditionalist and antitraditionalist interpretation, respectively. Justice Kennedy
interprets traditionally at some moments and antitraditionally at others.
While the consistency of Scalia and Stevens does not necessarily resolve the
interpretation/adjudication question, it is at least notable that Scalia and Stevens take themselves to be engaged in an interpretive exercise.
These are all valuable objections to, and possible alternative explanations of, traditionalism. But this Article’s aim has been to describe an interpretive approach as the Court and its Justices believe themselves to be using
it, and it takes what they say about what they are doing and why they are
doing it at face value. That assumption does not negate the possibility of selfdeception. Perhaps the fear of what fully principle-driven interpretation
might do leads traditionalist interpreters into a kind of exercise in avoidance,
knowing that the Constitution means X but interpreting it to mean Y for
some ulterior reason that the Justices may not even admit to themselves. But
this is not the way that the Court typically presents traditionalist interpretation. When it interprets traditionally, the Court takes itself to be interpreting
the Constitution, not avoiding the Constitution’s true meaning for the sake
of some other explicit or subconscious objective.
The discussion in Part II of traditionalism in action suggests that when
the Court or its Justices interpret traditionally, they believe that they are
offering an account of the Constitution’s meaning, rather than resolving a
dispute in a fashion that may be inconsistent with that meaning. They think
they are adopting a defeasible presumption that a people engaging in a practice for a long time and continuously over that span would not do so—and
would not continue to do so—unless it believed that its practice was consistent with the meaning of its foundational political document. That is an
377 This criticism could be made of any interpretive method. The Justices may rely on
precedent, moral principle, structure, and other methods even when they do not say so; or
they may not rely on them when they say that they do.
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exercise in the interpretation of the Constitution’s words—an inference
about what the words mean derived from how people bound by the document have behaved over time. As the Court put it in Town of Greece, this
Article’s first and perhaps clearest case of traditionalism: “[I]t is not necessary to define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice is permitted,” because the meaning of
the Clause is informed not by abstract principles extracted from vague words,
but by practices.378
CONCLUSION
This Article has identified a new interpretive method: the use of tradition to inform constitutional meaning. It has shown the prevalence and consistency of traditionalist interpretation across the domains of constitutional
doctrine. It has distilled three elements of traditionalism: a focus on American political and cultural practices; of substantial duration, encompassing
both a practice’s age and continuity; and carrying a powerful but defeasible
presumption of interpretive validity. And it has inferred from the doctrine
several explanations or justifications for interpreting traditionally, as well as
recurrent judicial criticism of the method.
Traditionalism exists across the Court’s constitutional doctrine. Its
scope and influence are considerable. Its purposes are rich and complex.
And it promises to figure prominently in many constitutional controversies
on the near and more distant horizon.

378

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014).
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